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Adriana Z. Robertson† 
This Article provides the first detailed empirical analysis of the landscape 
of U.S. stock market indices. First, I hand collect detailed information about the 
universe of indices used as benchmarks for U.S. mutual funds. I document 
substantial heterogeneity across indices and find that the overwhelming majority 
of the indices in my sample are used as a primary benchmark by only a single 
fund. I then turn to “passive” index funds and find that both these phenomena 
are even more extreme among the indices that these funds track. Far from being 
“passive,” my findings indicate that index investing is better understood as a 
form of delegated management, where the delegee is the index creator rather 
than the fund manager. Finally, I turn to ETFs and find that a substantial 
fraction of these funds track indices that they or their affiliates create. Even 
controlling for other factors, I find that these funds have, on average, higher 
expense ratios. My findings shed light on an overlooked part of the financial 
market and have substantial implications for investor protection. 
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Introduction 
Securities indices are central to modern financial markets. Investors rely on 
indices to evaluate their investment decisions. Mutual fund managers are often 
rewarded based on their success in outperforming some predetermined index.1 
 
 1.   See Linlin Ma, Yuehua Tang & Juan-Pedro Gómez, Portfolio Manager 
Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry, 73 J. FIN. 12 (2018) (reporting that in a large sample of 
U.S. mutual funds, managers were compensated based on performance relative to a benchmark index in 
over 60% of fund-year observations). 
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Academics rely on indices to act as benchmarks in empirical research.2 In recent 
years, their importance has only increased. With the rise of index funds—mutual 
funds designed to track a particular index—they are responsible for directing 
trillions of dollars’ worth of investments.3 They have also begun to take a more 
active role in corporate governance decisions. Last year, two major index 
providers—Standard & Poor’s4 (the creator of the S&P 500 index) and FTSE5 
(the creator of the Russell 1000 index)—made headlines in the financial press 
when they announced that they were changing their rules regarding the inclusion 
of firms that issue non-voting shares. 
Less attention has been paid to the indices themselves. Implicitly, they are 
treated as passive entities, which simply are. With a few exceptions, most 
scholars and even market participants do not think too hard about where the 
indices actually come from. As a result, they have become something of a black 
box in financial markets. One notable exception to this is an article on index 
theory, which seeks to create a taxonomy of types of indices and describe the 
ways in which they are used.6 My Article contributes to this literature by 
providing the first in-depth empirical analysis of stock market indices. 
In doing so, I seek to correct a pervasive misunderstanding: that stock 
market indices are “passive” in some meaningful sense. In a related paper, I make 
this point in the context of the S&P 500 stock market index.7 Here I take a step 
back and make this point in the context of the entire landscape of U.S. stock 
market indices. I show that there is a tremendous amount of diversity across 
indices, even among indices that purport to have similar aims. Far from being 
passive, these indices represent the deliberate decisions made by their managers. 
While this observation may seem, on some level, obvious, its implications 
are far-reaching and go to the heart of two of the most common uses of these 
indices: as performance benchmarks, and as the basis for “passive” investing. 
 
 2.   See Adriana Z. Robertson & Matthew Spiegel, Better Bond Indices and Liquidity 
Gaming the Rest 1 (Working Paper, Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.hec.ca/finance/Fichier/Spiegel2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T8Q3-4F6X] (noting that “[a]sset-pricing tests, commonly used by academics to test 
theories about market behavior, rely on indices, as do many of the tests used in the empirical corporate 
finance literature”). 
 3.   According to the Investment Company Institute, index mutual funds had net assets 
of almost $3.4 trillion at the end of 2017, over $2.7 trillion of which was in index equity mutual funds. 
2018 Investment Company Fact Book, INV. COMPANY INST. 125 (2018), https://www.ici.org/pdf/
2018_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYK6-AHW2]. 
 4.   Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces 
Decision on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/sp-dow-jones-indices-announces-decision-on-multi-class-shares-and-voting-rules-
300496954.html [https://perma.cc/99YS-AM63]. 
 5.   FTSE Russell Voting Rights Consultation—Next Steps, FTSE RUSSELL (July 2017), 
https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Steps.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KZV-YDQ5]. 
 6.   Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and 
Failure of Financial Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2013). 
 7.   See generally Adriana Z. Robertson, The (Mis)Uses of the S&P 500 (Working Paper, 
June 29, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205235 [https://perma.cc/MR3A-
ZNNC]. 
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When an index is used as a benchmark, it is essentially being used as the baseline 
against which the performance of some other investment portfolio can be 
compared. Logically, of course, any comparison between an investment and a 
benchmark is as much about the benchmark as it is about the investment in 
question. While this is true for all indices, including the large indices that 
dominate the market, it is even more obvious in the context of smaller, less 
popular indices. 
There is no shortage of such indices. I find that on average, there are five 
funds per benchmark index in the U.S. market, and over seventy-five percent of 
indices are being used as the primary benchmark by only a single fund. Not only 
is there a large number of these indices, I show that there is a tremendous amount 
of diversity across indices, even among indices that purport to have similar aims. 
These findings drive home the fact that, while benchmarking can be valuable, it 
must be interpreted with caution. 
Many of these indices are also used for “passive” or “index” investing, in 
which the principal goal of the fund is to track the underlying index as closely as 
reasonably possible. As with benchmarking, the idea that such investments are 
“passive” reflects the pervasive misunderstanding that I seek to dispel. Rather 
than being passive in any meaningful sense, index investing simply represents a 
form of delegated management, whereby the investor (the principal) empowers 
a delegee (her agent) to make decisions on her behalf. Instead of being truly 
passive, tracking an index almost always implies choosing a managed portfolio. 
Not only are these indices managed portfolios in the strictly financial sense, by 
their construction they often also imply a substantial amount of delegated 
decisionmaking authority. Seen in this light, the tremendous diversity of indices 
that I document should not be surprising. Just as there is a large number of 
“actively managed” mutual funds through which individuals delegate investment 
decisionmaking, there is also a large number of indices through which 
individuals engage in the same sort of delegation. 
I then investigate one particularly stark example of delegated management: 
the phenomenon of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) that “passively” track an 
index that is itself created by the fund manager, or an affiliate thereof. The idea 
that an ETF might follow an index that it creates is counterintuitive, and, to my 
knowledge, is not something that has been previously documented. I refer to 
these as “affiliated indices,” and I investigate potential explanations for this 
phenomenon. I find evidence consistent with the idea that the funds in question 
are doing so to take advantage of the popularity of “passive” funds and are 
passing costs along to investors in the form of higher expense ratios. 
Taken together, my results have substantial implications for investor 
protection and the regulation of mutual funds. Specifically, my analysis reveals 
substantial gaps in the current regulatory framework. Funds may be able to use 
their gaps to their advantage, possibly to the detriment of individual investors. 
My analysis therefore provides a basis for reevaluating certain aspects of the 
current regulatory regime, and I close by offering some recommendations. 
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss the 
role of indices in modern financial markets, including their use as benchmarks 
and as the basis for index investing. I also introduce the concepts of managed 
portfolios and delegated management. In Part II, I present the first part of my 
findings and document the heterogeneity across indices. In Part III, I turn to ETFs 
and analyze the phenomenon of affiliated indices and some potential 
explanations for this phenomenon. I discuss the implications of my findings in 
Part IV. The final Part concludes. 
I. Indices in Modern Financial Markets 
Indices are ubiquitous in modern financial markets. In this Section, I 
provide a brief overview of two specific roles that they play: as performance 
benchmarks, and as a basis for “index” investing. In doing so, I also discuss the 
manners in which indices are, and are not, regulated. While indices are not 
directly regulated in the United States,8 they are often implicated by the 
regulatory requirements of other entities. I then introduce the concept of a 
managed portfolio, and I argue that indices are best understood as managed, 
rather than passive, portfolios. Next, I discuss the conceptual issues associated 
with benchmarking against a managed portfolio. Finally, I introduce the concept 
of delegated management, particularly in the context of index investing. My 
discussions in the last two Sections foreshadow my analysis in Parts II and III, 
and I return to these issues in Part IV when I discuss the implications of my 
analysis. 
Before proceeding any further in this analysis, it is useful to take a step back 
and ask: What is an index? When you strip everything else away, an index is 
simply an aggregation of different pieces of information into a single number 
based on some algorithm.9 In the context of financial market indices, an index is 
simply a list with two columns: a date in the first column and a number—
representing either a return or a level—in the second column. From these two 
columns, one can plot the path—sometimes called the performance—of the 
index and can compare it against the performance of any other asset or portfolio. 
The next natural question to ask is where this list of numbers comes from. 
Generally, a stock market index is itself constructed from another list, also with 
 
 8.   Fast Answers: Market Indices, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answersindiceshtm.html [https://perma.cc/BQ4L-YSHN] (“The SEC does not regulate the 
content of these indices.”). 
 9.   This very general definition of an index can also be used in contexts beyond financial 
indices. For example, corporate governance indices, which combine information on a variety of firm 
characteristics, are popular in the corporate finance and corporate governance literature. See Paul A. 
Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 
(2003) (creating a “Governance Index” using twenty-four factors, including charter provisions, bylaw 
provisions, and other firm-level rules); see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What 
Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (proposing a refinement on Gompers 
et al. based on six factors). These indices assign a single number to each firm in each year. 
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two columns. The first contains a list of securities, while the second contains the 
corresponding weights associated with each security. Any time the index 
changes—either because the securities on the list change or because the weights 
associated with one or more of the securities change—a new list is created. As 
such, we can think of an index as a stack of lists, one for each day. 
The importance of indices in financial markets has been recognized in the 
academic literature since at least the mid-1980s, when Andrei Shleifer 
demonstrated that stocks tend to jump after being added to an index.10 Since that 
time, dozens of articles have been written exploring this issue and attempting to 
explain the reason for this effect.11 Even after more than thirty years, the so-
called “index inclusion” effect remains an active area of research in the finance 
literature.12 In fact, the index inclusion effect is so robust that it is often used by 
academic economists as a means of studying other features of financial 
markets.13 Further evidence of the importance of indices comes from a recent 
paper, which shows that the way indices are typically displayed has systematic 
effects on financial markets.14 
 
 10.   Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579 (1986). 
 11.   Notable among these is an article demonstrating that even a purely administrative 
change to the weighting of index constituents resulted in a price effect. Aditya Kaul, Vikas Mehrotra & 
Randall Morck, Demand Curves for Stocks Do Slope Down: New Evidence from an Index Weights 
Adjustment, 55 J. FIN. 893 (2000). For a sampling of other articles in this literature, see Messod D. Beneish 
& John C. Gardner, Information Costs and Liquidity Effects from Changes in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average List, 30 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 135 (1995); Jie Cai, What’s in the News? Information 
Content of S&P 500 Additions, 36 FIN. MGMT. 113 (2007); Rajesh Chakrabarti, Wei Huang, Narayanan 
Jayaraman & Jinsoo Lee, Price and Volume Effects of Changes in MSCI Indices—Nature and Causes, 29 
J. BANKING & FIN. 1237 (2005); Diane K. Denis, John J. McConnell, Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov & Yun Yu, 
S&P 500 Index Additions and Earnings Expectations, 58 J. FIN. 1821 (2003); Upinder Dhillon & Herb 
Johnson, Changes in the Standard and Poor’s 500 List, 64 J. BUS. 75 (1991); Lawrence Harris & Eitan 
Gurel, Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 List: New Evidence for the 
Existence of Price Pressures, 41 J. FIN. 815 (1986); Prem C. Jain, The Effect on Stock Price of Inclusion 
in or Exclusion from the S&P 500, 43 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 58 (1987); Anthony W. Lynch & Richard R. 
Mendenhall, New Evidence on Stock Price Effects Associated with Changes in the S&P 500 Index, 70 J. 
BUS. 351 (1997). 
 12.   See, e.g., Nimesh Patel & Ivo Welch, Extended Stock Returns in Response to S&P 
500 Index Changes, 7 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 172 (2017). 
 13.   This is such a commonly used technique that it has spawned a small literature of its 
own. See Ian Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Identification Using Russell 1000/2000 Index 
Assignments: A Discussion of Methodologies (Working Paper, Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2641548 [https://perma.cc/65CL-8PCU]. Recently, 
a controversy has erupted over the appropriate use of this technique. Compare Alex Young, Will the Real 
Specification Please Stand Up? A Comment on Andrew Bird and Stephen Karolyi, 15 ECON. J. WATCH 
35 (2018) (highlighting concerns about the empirical methodology used in a recently published article 
and referring to several other recent articles relying on Russell inclusion decisions), with Andrew Bird & 
Stephen A. Karolyi, Response to Alex Young, 15 ECON. J. WATCH 49 (2018) (responding to the criticisms 
leveled in the aforementioned article). For the purposes of this Article, I take no position on this issue, 
and I mention it only to highlight an example of the central importance of indices in both academic 
research and financial markets. 
 14.   Samuel M. Hartzmark & David H. Solomon, Reconsidering Returns (Working 
Paper, Nov. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039507 
[https://perma.cc/2PFJ-XKFF]. 
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A. Indices as Benchmarks and the Rise of Index Investing 
1. Indices as Benchmarks 
While financial market indices have many uses,15 in the equity market, two 
uses stand out: for portfolio benchmarking and for tracking. In the former, the 
performance of some portfolio (for example, a mutual fund) is evaluated by 
comparing it to the performance of the benchmark index. In other words, a 
benchmark is simply a “standard against which the performance of a security or 
a mutual fund can be measured.”16 Indeed, in the context of the mutual fund 
industry, the terms “benchmark” and “index” are so closely related that the entry 
for “benchmark” in the Investment Company Institute’s glossary of mutual fund 
terms contains a cross-reference to the term “index,” and the definition of 
“index” reads, in part, “[a] portfolio of assets that tracks the performance of a 
particular financial market or subset of it . . . and serves as a benchmark against 
which to evaluate a fund’s performance.”17 
It appears that investors take performance relative to a fund’s benchmark 
index into consideration in making investment decisions and that funds in turn 
respond to this. For example, there is evidence that funds choose their benchmark 
indices strategically and that their performance relative to their reported 
benchmark matters to investors above and beyond the overall performance of the 
fund.18 
Recognizing the substantial benefits of relative portfolio evaluation,19 the 
SEC requires mutual funds to select a benchmarked index and to report 
performance relative to that index. Specifically, in addition to their own returns, 
funds that have annual returns for at least one calendar year are required to report 
the returns of “an appropriate broad-based securities market index.”20 The choice 
of benchmark, however, is largely left to the discretion of the fund. According 
to the instructions, the definition of “appropriate broad-based securities market 
index” is simply an index “that is administered by an organization that is not an 
affiliated person of the Fund, its investment adviser, or principal underwriter, 
unless the index is widely recognized and used.”21 Importantly, this definition 
 
 15.   See generally Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 6. 
 16.   Glossary of Mutual Fund and Other Related Financial Terms, INV. COMPANY INST. 
1 (2018), https://www.ici.org/pdf/bro_mf_glossary.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4ZN-HQFF]. 
 17.   Id. at 1, 5. 
 18.   Berk A. Sensoy, Performance Evaluation and Self-Designated Benchmark Indexes 
in the Mutual Fund Industry, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (2009). 
 19.   See, e.g., Disclosure of Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Managers, 
Investment Company Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050 (Apr. 12, 1993) (adopting benchmark requirements 
premised on the idea that they would “give investors more information upon which to evaluate the 
performance of mutual funds”). 
 20.   SEC, FORM N-1A 8 https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XKX5-F96P]. 
 21.   Id. at 61. 
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places restrictions on the identity of the index administrator, not on the design or 
function of the index itself. 
Funds are also allowed, and even encouraged, to report their performance 
relative to additional indices. Specifically, a fund is encouraged to compare its 
performance to “other more narrowly based indexes that reflect the market 
sectors in which the [f]und invests.”22 Moreover, a fund is also permitted to 
“compare its performance to an additional broad-based index, or to a non-
securities index (e.g., the Consumer Price Index), so long as the comparison is 
not misleading.”23 Note that the instructions do not appear to restrict the order in 
which the benchmark indices must be presented, despite the fact that the first 
index may receive a disproportionate amount of investor attention.24 
2. The Rise of Index Investing 
A second prominent use of indices—particularly in the mutual fund 
context—is for so-called “index investing.” In contrast to an actively managed 
mutual fund, where the fund manager is empowered to buy or sell assets at any 
time based on an overall investment strategy, index funds (sometimes called 
“index-based” funds or, alternatively, “passive” funds) seek to track an 
underlying index as closely as possible.25 Index investing has taken on an 
increasingly important role in recent years. One recent report published by the 
Bank for International Settlements found that “passive funds managed about . . . 
20% of aggregate investment fund assets as of June 2017, up from 8% a decade 
earlier.”26 This rise has been particularly concentrated in U.S. equity assets, 
where passive funds now make up 43% of total U.S. equity fund assets.27 
 
 22.   Id. 
 23.   Id. 
 24.   Despite the prevalence of benchmarking in the investment industry, there is 
something rather puzzling about it. In most industries, the natural comparator for one product or service 
is its competitors, not some other thing called a benchmark. Regardless of whether we conceptualize 
mutual funds as selling products (for example, shares) or services (for example, asset management 
services), it is not entirely obvious why the right comparator in this industry should be qualitatively 
different from that norm. In the release in which it adopted its benchmarking requirements, the SEC 
acknowledged that it has received “several” comments urging it to permit “peer group” comparisons, 
arguing that “an investor wants to know how his or her fund performed in comparison with other funds 
having similar investment objectives.” Disclosure of Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio Managers, 
Investment Company Act, 58 Fed. Reg. at 19,054. The SEC declined to adopt this approach, noting that 
“[t]he index comparison requirement is designed to show how much value the management of the fund 
added by showing whether the fund ‘outperformed’ or ‘under-performed’ the market, and not so much 
whether one fund ‘out-performed’ another. A fund could underperform a relevant market, while 
nevertheless comparing favorably with its peers.” Id. It is worth noting, of course, that these comments 
were made in 1993, when the landscape of stock market indices may have been very different. 
 25.   See Off. of Inv. Educ. and Adv., Mutual Funds and ETFs: A Guide for Investors, 
SEC 19-20, https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DE4-
5VDA] (providing a short description of both “index-based funds” and “actively managed funds”). 
 26.   Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of Passive Investing for 
Securities Markets, 2018 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV. 133, 114. 
 27.   Id. at 115. 
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Recently, the implications of the rise of index-linked investing on financial 
markets has been the subject of substantial scholarly work. One branch of this 
literature has focused on the potential anticompetitive effects of common 
ownership driven by large institutional investors and index funds as well as 
potential solutions to this problem.28 
A second branch of this literature has emphasized a concern about the effect 
of index investing on corporate behavior and financial markets. In both cases, 
the literature is mixed. For example, in the context of corporate behavior, Lucian 
Bebchuk and coauthors have highlighted the governance concerns implicated by 
index investing,29 and some scholars have found evidence that index investing 
affects the relationship between firm investment decisions and investment 
opportunities.30 At the same time, other scholars have found evidence that index 
fund ownership actually improves corporate governance31 and facilitates 
investor activism.32 The same is true with respect to stock market implications. 
Here, scholars have focused on the implications of index investing for stock 
market price efficiency and liquidity, yielding mixed results.33 
 
 28.   This literature remains contentious. The whale in this area is José Azar, Martin C. 
Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018). It has 
also led to various spinoff papers. See, e.g., Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine & Martin C. 
Schmalz, Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (ECGI Fin., Working Paper 
No. 511, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332 [https://perma.cc/B2QE-
4BN2]; Miguel Anton, Florian Ederer, Mireia Gine & Martin C. Schmalz, Innovation: The Bright Side of 
Common Ownership? (Working Paper, Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3099578 [https://perma.cc/LT7L-NBUZ]. For an 
article suggesting a solution to these anticompetitive concerns, see Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton 
& E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 669 (2017). Note that the initial empirical finding—that common ownership has anticompetitive 
effects—is not universally accepted. For a paper taking the opposite position, see Patrick J. Dennis, 
Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in 
the Airline Industry (Working Paper, Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063465 [https://perma.cc/GCG5-M3LH]. For a 
reply to this article, see José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Reply to: “Common Ownership 
Does Not Have Anti-Competitive Effects in the Airline Industry” (Working Paper, May 10, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3168095 [https://perma.cc/K8CF-8TAR]. 
 29.   Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of 
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89 (2017). 
 30.   See, e.g., Constantinos Antoniou, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam & Onur Kemal Tosun, 
ETF Ownership and Corporate Investment (Working Paper, Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184949 [https://perma.cc/9C8W-YQ2J] (finding 
evidence that the investment decisions of firms with higher ETF ownership shares tend to be less sensitive 
to firm investment opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s Q). 
 31.   Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive 
Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111 (2016). 
 32.   Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of 
Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism (Working Paper, June 30, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693145 [https://perma.cc/6GCG-QD4J]. After a 
thorough analysis of the literature on the relationship between “passive” funds and governance, Fisch et 
al. conclude that the evidence suggests that these investors “improve both firm governance and 
performance.” Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A 
Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors 8 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No. 414/2018, 2019). 
 33.   See generally Jeffrey L. Coles, Davidson Heath & Matthew C. Ringgenberg, On 
Index Investing (Working Paper, June 6, 2018), 
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All of this literature has taken the behavior of the indices themselves as 
given. In doing so, they have overlooked the fact that index investing is simply 
another form of delegated management.34 As such, it is best understood not as a 
new phenomenon, but rather as the next step in the movement away from direct 
shareholder governance and toward increasingly delegated decisionmaking. I 
discuss the implications of this in Part IV. 
Before proceeding, it is worth pausing to note that it is not always entirely 
clear what people have in mind when they use the term “passive” to refer to index 
investing. It cannot simply mean that the fund manager has no, or almost no, 
discretion in selecting securities—presumably if the fund manager had no 
discretion in selecting securities, but rather was required to invest in whatever 
the person sitting one desk over from her told her to buy, we would not think of 
this as being “passive.” Rather, the idea of “passive” investing has a flavor of 
being meaningfully rules-based: rather than picking and choosing securities, the 
fund is following predetermined rules. In light of this, when the investor chooses 
which index fund she wants to buy, she will presumably look at the relevant rules 
and decide whether these are the rules that she wants her portfolio to follow. A 
related, albeit distinct, concept of “passivity” is the idea that, in contrast to an 
actively managed fund, an index fund is not trying to “beat” the market. Rather, 
it is simply trying to track the market, or some segment thereof. Of course, this 
concept begs the question of what “the market” or the “relevant segment” is. 
Why would an investor be interested in investing in such a fund? One 
possibility is that they provide a relatively cheap means of obtaining 
diversification. In that case, of course, there is nothing per se desirable about 
index investing. Rather, index funds simply happen to offer, on average, 
relatively good diversification at relatively low costs. Of course, under this view, 
there is no particular reason to think of index funds as being meaningfully 
different from other funds, or even of distinguishing them from other types of 
mutual funds at all. 
An alternative explanation, which takes seriously the fact that tracking an 
index is a material part of what makes an index fund qualitatively different from 
any other fund, is the possibility that index investing allows fund managers to 
precommit to some investment strategy. Rather than having wide discretion, by 
committing to following some specified index, the fund manager can credibly 
commit to potential investors how she will invest their money. To the extent that 
investors want to limit the discretion of fund managers, this constraint may be 
desirable to them. Of course, this constraint does not eliminate managerial 
discretion—rather, as Section I.D will discuss, it simply transfers it to the index 
creator. 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3055324 [https://perma.cc/29BY-QGDC] (finding 
evidence that index investing introduces noise into stock prices but no evidence that it reduces price 
efficiency or liquidity). 
 34.   See discussion infra Section I.D. 
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B. Indices as Managed Portfolios 
Despite the ubiquity of indices and the rich literature focusing on their 
effects, there has been little work done on indices qua indices. Moreover, despite 
the central role indices play in modern financial markets, little is known about 
how they go about selecting which securities to include or exclude.35 To the 
extent that financial economists have paid any attention to the decisions made by 
index providers, it has generally been to note in passing that some indices—
notably the Russell 1000 and 2000—operate via fairly mechanical rules, whereas 
others involve some amount of discretion.36 Similarly, despite the fact that 
indices are both plentiful and ubiquitous, no generally accepted method exists 
for comparing the performance of one index to another.37 While the ideal 
benchmark for the purposes of academic finance may be one that is as close to a 
pure “buy-and-hold” portfolio as possible,38 this may or may not be true in other 
contexts. Even if it is true in theory, in practice, after examining hundreds of 
indices, I found none that were truly passive. Rather, all of them represent 
managed portfolios in that sense. 
What do I mean when I say that some index is a managed portfolio? In 
contrast to a buy-and-hold portfolio, a managed portfolio is one in which some 
trading occurs.39 A buy-and-hold portfolio is precisely what it sounds like: the 
portfolio manager simply selects securities and weights at day one, forms her 
portfolio, and then sits back and waits. No trading, rebalancing, or other activity 
of any kind occurs. This is not to say that no management or stock-picking 
occurs. After all, the manager had to decide what stocks to include in her 
portfolio, and in what proportions, at day one. The passivity kicks in after day 
one, where no further action is taken. 
It is important to note that there can be tremendous diversity across 
managed portfolios. For example, one can distinguish between a purely rules-
based managed portfolio and an actively managed portfolio. A portfolio that 
consists of the 100 largest stocks on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
would be a managed portfolio—as stocks change in size, the composition of the 
portfolio would change. The fact that the changes occur entirely by operation of 
a preset rule doesn’t change the fact that the portfolio is changing. Alternatively, 
 
 35.   One notable exception to this is work by Rauterberg and Verstein, which provides 
a systematic overview of how indices are used and proposes a taxonomy of financial indices. Rauterberg 
& Verstein, supra note 6, at 1. Rauterberg and Verstein also emphasize the subjectivity and human 
discretion element that goes into indices, highlighting what they call “the myth of objectivity.” Id. at 5. 
This Article builds on their theoretical insight by providing the first systematic empirical evidence of the 
landscape of stock market indices. 
 36.   See discussion supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 37.   Robertson & Spiegel, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that the authors “are aware of no 
standard method for comparing one index’s accuracy to another,” before proposing and implementing a 
series of tests). 
 38.   Id. at 1 (arguing that “[a]ny good benchmark should represent a passive strategy 
that can be followed without any special knowledge”). 
 39.   See JOHN H. COCHRANE, ASSET PRICING 134-135 (rev. ed. 2005). 
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a manager might have discretion to select individual stocks for her portfolio, 
based on whatever criteria she sees fit, including her own intuition about future 
performance. The difference between this portfolio and the portfolio of the 100 
largest stocks on the NYSE is that while the latter is a managed portfolio, the 
former is an actively managed portfolio. 
Based on the preceding discussion, it should be clear that indices are, in 
general, managed portfolios. Even assuming that the index methodology stays 
constant, the composition of securities on the index changes over time according 
to that methodology. Indeed, after analyzing the entire universe of indices that 
are used as benchmarks for U.S. mutual funds, I did not find a single index that 
follows a pure buy-and-hold strategy: all of them are, at the very least, managed 
portfolios.40 
As it turns out, however, index methodologies do tend to change over time. 
To take just one example, the methodology for the S&P 500 changed at least 
eight times between January 1, 2015, and April 30, 2018,41 and overall, the 
methodologies of this family of indices42 changed twenty-two times within that 
period.43 The S&P is not unique in this regard. For example, the methodology 
employed in constructing the Russell U.S. Equity indices was modified four 
times between July 2017 and May 2018.44 Together, the indices in these families 
comprise a disproportionate share of the market for benchmark indices. As 
shown in more detail below in Section II.A, they represent 18 of the 20 most 
popular benchmark indices by number of funds and 15 of the 20 largest by assets 
under management (“AUM”).45 
Not only do methodologies change over time, they often also explicitly 
grant the index creator some amount of discretion. Sometimes this discretion is 
relatively narrow—for example, in interpreting a rule for edge cases. Other 
times, the discretion is much broader, such as in the case of the Dow Jones 
 
 40.   See infra Part II. 
 41.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P U.S. INDICES METHODOLOGY 35-37 (Apr. 2018) 
(on file with author). 
 42.   By family of indices, I mean related indices created by a single index provider. For 
example, the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 are all part of the same family of 
indices. This is distinct from a fund family. For a detailed analysis of the incentives of fund families, 
including their incentives with respect to index funds, see Fisch et al, supra note 32. 
 43.   S&P U.S. INDICES METHODOLOGY, supra note 41. While some of these rule 
changes are quite minor, others represent material changes to the construction of the index. For example, 
on July 31, 2017, S&P Dow Jones Indices announced that the S&P Composite 1500 and its component 
indices (which includes the S&P 500) would no longer add companies with multiple share class structures. 
Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, supra note 4. For a more detailed discussion of changes to the 
S&P 500 methodology, see generally Robertson, supra note 7. 
 44.   See FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY INDEXES: CONSTRUCTION AND 
METHODOLOGY UPDATE 1 (July 28, 2017) (on file with author); FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY 
INDEXES: CONSTRUCTION AND METHODOLOGY UPDATE 1 (Oct. 20, 2017) (on file with author); FTSE 
RUSSELL, RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY INDEXES: CONSTRUCTION AND METHODOLOGY UPDATE 1 (Dec. 1, 
2017) (on file with author); FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY INDEXES: CONSTRUCTION AND 
METHODOLOGY UPDATE 1-2 (May 3, 2018) (on file with author). 
 45.   See infra Table 2. 
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Industrial Average, which, as discussed below,46 has no quantitative rules for 
selecting constituents.47 Others still contain enough ambiguity so as to make it 
difficult for a third party to determine exactly how the index will be constructed 
going forward.48 The most extreme examples of these are indices that rely on 
proprietary methodologies.49 
This argument—that indices are managed portfolios—is perhaps 
counterintuitive. Perhaps because of the ubiquity of the idea of “passive 
investing”—i.e., an investment strategy in which the investor attempts to invest 
in a way that tracks some index—indices have come to be associated with 
passive portfolios. Of course, these are false friends: the fact that an investor 
“passively” follows an index does not imply that the index itself is passive.50 
In the next two Sections, I introduce the conceptual implications of this 
insight in the context of benchmarking and index investing, respectively. I leave 
a more detailed discussion of the implications of my findings for Part IV. 
C. Benchmarking Against Managed Portfolios 
It should be fairly straightforward to see why this insight is relevant in the 
context of benchmarking. First, given that no index is truly passive, in the sense 
of being a pure buy-and-hold portfolio, any comparison between an investment 
portfolio and an index necessarily implies a comparison with a managed 
portfolio. Sometimes this may be precisely the right thing to do. For example, an 
investor who is herself holding a managed portfolio could be entirely correct in 
comparing its performance to that of another managed portfolio. In that case, by 
comparing the performance of her portfolio to the benchmark, she can answer 
the question of “how did my managed portfolio do compared to this other 
managed portfolio?” She is, in other words, comparing one type of management 
to another. 
In contrast, an investor who has chosen to invest in a truly passive 
fashion—by buying securities and simply holding them—and who compares his 
performance to that of an index is asking something quite different. In fact, he is 
asking two questions: “How does the performance of my passive portfolio 
compare to that of a managed portfolio?” and “How does the performance of my 
portfolio compare to that of this particular managed portfolio?” While the 
second one is the same as above, the first is not. In general, managed portfolios 
 
 46.   See infra Section II.D.1. 
 47.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, DOW JONES AVERAGES METHODOLOGY 3, 5 (Apr. 2017) 
(on file with author). 
 48.   See infra Section II.D. 
 49.   See infra Section II.C.4. 
 50.   People can also actively trade in “passive” funds, such as ETFs, further muddying 
the waters of “passive” investing. I leave this possibility aside and focus on the “passivity” of the indices 
themselves and of the funds that track them. 
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will outperform passive portfolios over long horizons,51 leading to biased 
comparisons.52 
This leads to the second critical issue related to benchmarking—that any 
comparison against a benchmark is as much about the benchmark as it is about 
the comparator. While the old adage refers to a comparison between apples and 
oranges, one could just as well speak of comparing oranges to apples. In the 
context of mutual funds or stock portfolios, this implies that it is crucial to select 
an appropriate benchmark index before making any comparisons. Naturally, in 
order to do so, one must first understand the details of the benchmark index. 
Otherwise, any comparison is, at best, useless, and at worst, misleading. I return 
to this issue in Section IV.C. 
D. Index Investing and Delegated Management 
The basic idea of delegated management is quite simple: in the abstract, it 
simply means that rather than making all the relevant decisions alone, one retains 
a delegee, or an agent, to make decisions on one’s behalf. In the corporate 
context, this the familiar story of the separation of ownership and control.53 
Rather than running the company themselves, investors elect board members, 
who hire managers to run the company’s day-to-day activities.54 
Investors can do something similar at the portfolio level: rather than 
personally managing their security portfolios, they can retain a manager to do it 
for them, for example, by buying shares in some sort of fund, such as a hedge 
fund or an actively managed mutual fund. By doing so, the investors are 
delegating the decisions around which stocks to buy and sell (and in what 
quantities), and when to do it, to the fund manager. Alternatively, an investor 
could purchase an index fund, which tracks some underlying index. Here, the 
buying and selling decisions are taken out of the hands of the managers.55 Instead 
of the fund manager, these decisions are simply being made by the index 
providers. Somebody is still making the decisions, and delegated management is 
still occurring. 
While individuals may be happier not having to manage the day-to-day 
features of their financial lives, delegated management almost invariably leads 
to concerns about agency problems. These problems are well known and well 
understood. Much of the literature on corporate law and corporate governance is 
focused on identifying and remedying agency problems, and one of the primary 
 
 51.   See COCHRANE, supra note 39, at 132-136. 
 52.   See generally Robertson, supra note 7 (quantifying the extent of that 
outperformance in the context of the S&P 500). 
 53.   See Roberta Romano, Preface, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW, at v (2d. ed. 
2006) (“The key feature of the public corporation is Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’ insight concerning 
the separation of ownership and control: managers of the firm, who run the business, are not the owners.”). 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   This is not entirely true. Even in a “passively” managed fund, fund managers still 
have some discretion (generally to reduce transactions costs and tracking error), but it is relatively minor. 
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purposes of corporate law is addressing and minimizing these problems.56 While 
running a company is more complex than managing a stock portfolio, the same 
types of concerns can arise in the portfolio management context. 
Not all delegation is delegated management. The “management” portion of 
delegated management implies some discretion or decisionmaking by the agent 
that is not predetermined or directly supervised by the principal—here, the 
investor. For example, if an investor wrote a complete contingent list of 
investment rules and asked the manager to implement those rules, it would be 
odd to call that delegated management. The “manager” in that example would 
simply be executing the instructions. Similarly, if the investor instructed the fund 
manager to track a particular index, and the investor knew exactly what that 
index was going to do on any given day and under any given set of 
circumstances, it would be strange to think of this as delegated management. The 
investor need not even have written the rules herself. Suppose instead that she 
simply selected the index from a menu of index offerings, each of which 
followed clear mechanical rules that she fully understood. Here again, all the 
managerial decisionmaking—as far as the investor’s portfolio is concerned—is 
done at the moment that the investor selects which of the indices she wants her 
fund manager to track. If the index rules are clear and mechanical, the rules do 
not change, and the index creator has no meaningful decisionmaking authority, 
we would not think of tracking that index as delegated management. 
While in theory it would be possible to construct an index with those 
characteristics—an index that is purely mechanical and fully transparent ex 
ante—after reviewing the methodology documents of over 600 indices, I did not 
find a single one that operated in that way.57 Rather, as discussed in Part II, many 
either provided for substantial amounts of discretion or were described in such a 
way as to make it virtually impossible for a third party to precisely interpret the 
stated criteria. 
This observation has substantial implications, both conceptual and 
concrete. While there is nothing inherently wrong with delegating managerial 
decisionmaking,58 it is important to recognize that this is what investors are doing 
when they engage in index investing. I return to this issue in Section IV.A, with 
a particular focus on the implications for investor protection. Before doing so, I 
turn to the empirical portions of this Article. 
 
 56.   Romano, supra note 53, Preface (noting that “[m]uch of corporate law is directed 
at mitigating agency problems”). 
 57.   As discussed in more detail below, there is nothing inherently wrong with delegated 
management; it is simply something that must be recognized and treated accordingly. See discussion infra 
Part IV. 
 58.   See discussion infra Part IV. 
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II. The Landscape of Indices 
While even many relatively financially sophisticated individuals would be 
hard pressed to name more than a handful of indices, it turns out that there are 
thousands of different securities indices in the world,59 hundreds of which focus 
on U.S. equity securities. In a related paper, I perform a detailed quantitative 
analysis on the giant among these—the S&P 500—and look at the implications 
of its security selection decisions. Repeating this analysis for each of these other 
indices is infeasible for both practical and technical reasons.60 Instead, in this 
Section, I take a different approach. Rather than delving into the implications of 
security selection, I take a step back and examine the security selection process 
itself. In other words, this Section builds on the idea of indices as managed 
portfolios and explores the differences in how these portfolios are managed. I do 
so with two aims in mind: (1) to explore why there is such a profusion of indices, 
and (2) to shed light on how the indices differ from each other, if at all. In doing 
so, I hope to shed some light on this previously unexplored landscape. 
A. The Sample 
To ensure that my sample was as comprehensive as possible, I began by 
casting a wide net. Using data from Morningstar Direct, on July 26, 2017, I 
obtained a list of all equity mutual funds available for sale in the United States. 
Morningstar Direct is marketed as “an investment analysis platform built for 
asset management and financial services professionals”61 and is also used by 
academics in the finance literature.62 This list included open-ended equity mutual 
funds, ETFs, and closed-end funds. In order to ensure that I did not miss 
anything, I also included open- and closed-end funds as well as ETFs available 
for sale in the U.S. that were classified by Morningstar Direct as “Alternative” 
 
 59.   A search of Morningstar Direct on August 3, 2017, returned over 67,000 indices, 
including equity indices, fixed income indices, and “alternative” indices. Even after aggressively 
eliminating duplicates—for example, instances where the same index was offered in different 
currencies—I was left with about 29,000 indices. There were a total of 307 index creators in my sample, 
and the average index creator in my sample is associated with 95 indices, with a median of 5, indicating 
a highly skewed distribution. 145 of these creators have at least one equity index, with a mean of 59 
indices per creator and a median of 3, exhibiting a similarly large skew. This high degree of skewness 
means that while a relatively small number of index providers dominate this market (FTSE/Russell, MSCI 
and S&P in the equity market, and Bank of American/Merrill Lynch, Bloomberg/Barclays, Citi and Markit 
in the fixed income market), there are also hundreds of smaller providers. In total, 282 index providers 
appeared fewer than 100 times in the data, and 206 appeared fewer than 10 times. 
 60.   Practically, doing so would require a large amount of data cleaning and computing 
power. Technically, unlike S&P, most index providers in my sample do not make the historical 
constituents of their indices available. 
 61.   MORNINGSTAR DIRECT, https://www.morningstar.com/products/direct 
[https://perma.cc/AR3Y-T3SD]. 
 62.   For a recent example, see Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital 
Outperformance, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 291 (2016) (classifying as “active share managers” those who 
manage funds whose holdings differ substantially from their benchmark as reported on Morningstar Direct 
and finding that among these funds, those who trade infrequently outperform those who do not). 
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or “Miscellaneous,” or whose type was missing. Because this last group 
introduced a wide variety of different types of funds that were not focused on 
equities, I then removed funds that had a Morningstar category that clearly 
indicated that they were not equity funds.63 
Because I was interested in limiting my attention to the U.S. market, I 
dropped all funds that Morningstar categorized as focusing on foreign markets.64 
I then went through the remaining indices and eliminated funds that were 
benchmarked to indices that were clearly either non-U.S. focused or were not 
equity indices.65 Finally, because I was interested in the relationship between 
 
 63.   Specifically, I dropped funds in the following Morningstar categories: “Alt - Fund 
of Funds – Multistrategy,” “Alt - Fund of Funds - Other,” “Alt - Fund of Funds - Europe,” “Managed 
Futures,” “Miscellaneous - Income and Real Property,” “Multicurrency,” “Option Writing,” “Single 
Currency,” “Trading - Leveraged/Inverse Commodities,” “Trading - Inverse Commodities,” “Trading - 
Inverse Debt,” “Trading - Leveraged Commodities,” and “Trading - Leveraged Debt.” 
 64.   Specifically, I dropped all funds in the following Morningstar categories: “Asia 
Pacific Equity,” “China Region,” “Diversified Emerging Mkts,” “Diversified Pacific/Asia,” “Emerging 
Markets Equity,” “Europe Stock,” “European Equity,” “Greater China Equity,” “India Equity,” “Japan 
Stock,” “Latin America Stock,” “Pacific/Asia ex-Japan Stk,” “Asia Pacific ex-Japan Equity,” “Foreign 
Large Blend,” “Foreign Large Growth,” “Foreign Large Value,” “Foreign Small/Mid Blend,” “Foreign 
Small/Mid Growth,” “Foreign Small/Mid Value,” “Global Emerging Markets Equity,” “Miscellaneous 
Region,” and “Other Asia-Pacific Equity.” I also dropped funds to which Morningstar assigned a country 
category “Europe.” 
 65.   The funds I dropped were those that were benchmarked to the following indices: 
“BBgBarc Capital US Agg Bond TR USD,” “Barclays US Tr 2Y/10Y Yield Curve TR USD,” “Bitcoin 
Market Price PR USD,” “BofAML 3M Trsy Bill +3% Wrap,” “BofAML US Treasury Bill 3 Mon TR 
USD 50.00000% + MSCI World NR USD 50.00000%,” “FTSE 3-month U.S.T-Bill + 4% USD,” 
“Hartford Risk-Optim Multif REIT TR USD,” “JPY USD,” “8JPY/USD TR USD,” “MSCI US REIT 
USD,” “3-Month LIBOR,” “BBgBarc 1-3 Yr US Treasury TR USD,” “BBgBarc Global Aggregate TR 
Hdg USD,” “BBgBarc Global Aggregate TR USD,” “BBgBarc Municipal 5 Yr 4-6 TR USD,” “BBgBarc 
Municipal TR USD,” “BBgBarc US Agg Bond TR USD,” “BBgBarc US Corporate High Yield TR USD,” 
“BBgBarc US Govt/Credit TR USD,” “BBgBarc US Treasury Bill 1-3 Mon TR USD,” “BBgBarc US 
Trsy Bellwethers 3Mon TR USD,” “BBgBarc US Trsy Infl Note 1-10Y TR USD,” “BONY China Select 
ADR TR USD,” “BONY Emerging Markets 50 ADR TR USD,” “BONY Latin America 35 ADR TR 
USD,” “BofAML US Treasuries 1-5Y Yld USD,” “BofAML US Treasury Bill 3 Mon TR USD,” 
“BofAML US Treasury Bills 0-3 Mon TR USD,” “BofAML US Treasury Bills TR USD,” “BofAML 
USD LIBID 1 Mon Average TR USD,” “BofAML USD LIBOR 3 Mon CM,” “BofAML USD LIBOR 6 
Mon CM TR USD,” “Citi Treasury Bill 1 Mon USD,” “Citi Treasury Bill 3 Mon USD,” “DJ US Select 
REIT TR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Europe NR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT 
Developed Ex US NR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Ex US TR USD,” “FTSE Developed 
Europe All Cap NR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Dv ex NA NR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global 
Ex US TR USD,” “FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global REITs NR USD,” “FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs 
TR USD,” “FTSE NAREIT All REITs TR,” “FTSE NAREIT Equity REITs TR USD,” “ICE LIBOR 1 
Month USD,” “ICE LIBOR 3 Month USD,” “MSCI ACWI Ex USA IMI NR USD,” “MSCI ACWI Ex 
USA NR USD,” “MSCI Brazil 25-50 GR USD,” “MSCI Brazil 25-50 NR USD,” “MSCI India NR USD,” 
“MSCI Japan GR USD,” “MSCI Japan NR USD,” “MSCI Korea 25-50 NR USD,” “MSCI Mexico IMI 
25-50 GR USD,” “MSCI Mexico IMI 25-50 NR USD,” “MSCI US REIT GR USD,” “MSCI US REIT 
NR USD,” “MVIS Russia NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI Energy Sector NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-
US BMI Financl Sector NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI HealthCare Sec PR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US 
BMI IT Sector NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI Industrial Sec NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI 
Materia Sector NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI Telecom Svc Se NR USD,” “S&P Dev Ex-US BMI 
Utilit Sector NR USD,” “S&P Dev ExUS BMI ConsDiscret Sec NR USD,” “S&P Developed Ex US 
Property NR USD,” “S&P Developed Ex US Property TR USD’ “S&P Developed Property TR USD,” 
“S&P Developed Small TR USD,” “S&P Dvlp Ex US Consumer Staple GR USD,” “S&P Global Ex US 
Property NR USD,” “S&P Global Ex US REIT NR USD,” “S&P Global REIT NR USD,” “S&P Global 
REIT TR USD,” “US Dollar,” “USTREAS Federal Funds,” “Wilshire US REIT TR USD,” “Wilshire US 
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funds and their benchmark indices, I then dropped all funds for which no 
benchmark index was recorded. 
After eliminating duplicates, this left a total of 897 indices. With the help 
of a research assistant, I then obtained the methodology document associated 
with each index. In a few cases, no formal methodology document was available. 
In such cases, I relied on other publicly available sources to obtain the required 
information.66 I then read through each methodology document. Based on this 
review, I identified 83 of these as indices that are primarily composed of non-
stock assets67 and another 213 as indices that are primarily or exclusively 
composed of non-U.S. equities or are designed to cover regions that extend 
beyond the United States.68 This leaves a total of 601 indices, which benchmark 
3,206 mutual funds (for a total of 9,091 fund-classes). 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics – Indices (Full Sample) 
  




 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Number of 
Funds 5.33 38.52 1 1 1 1 3 601 
Aggregate AUM 
(millions) 16,183 170,682 5 36 267 1,641 9,166 601 
This table presents the distribution of number of funds by index as well as the aggregate AUM 
invested in funds (in millions of dollars) by index. The first column presents the average number of 
funds per index as well as the average total AUM per index. The second column presents the standard 
deviations of the same. The third through seventh columns present the 10th, 25th, 50th (i.e., the 
median), 75th, and 90th percentiles of the distributions.     
 
RESI TR USD,” “WisdomTree Gbl Ex Us Real Estate TR USD,” “DJ Gbl Ex US Select RESI NR USD,” 
“AUD/USD TR USD,” “Double Long Euro TR USD,” “Double Short Euro TR USD,” “EUR/USD TR 
USD,” “FTSE China 50 NR USD,” “FTSE China 50 USD TR USD,” “FTSE Developed Europe All Cap 
TR USD,” “MSCI Europe NR USD,” “MSCI Europe Small Cap NR USD,” “MSCI Europe/Financials 
NR USD,” and “WisdomTree Gbl ex-US Hdg Real Es TR USD.” 
 66.   For example, in some cases, no formal index methodology document was available, 
but a description of the index was available on the index provider’s website. In other cases, a prospectus 
for an associated ETF was available, and I was able to obtain methodology information from the 
prospectus. In other cases, a factsheet or other description file relating to an ETN or ETF was available, 
which contained information on the underlying index. After all this, there were three indices that remained. 
For one, the “Barclays Long/Short Equity Index,” I relied on a short description of the index provided by 
the fund that was using it as an index to characterize it as a specialized index. The two remaining were 
the “BofAML Technology 100” and the “S&P United States Property” indices. Based on their names, I 
inferred that both were industry indices. I made no inferences about the other characteristics of these 
indices. My results are not sensitive to the exclusion of these indices. 
 67.   For example, some of these indices primarily track assets like ETFs, MLPs, or 
REITs. Others are indices of hedge funds, or of other indices. 
 68.   For these purposes, I treat equities listed on U.S. exchanges as U.S. equities. As 
such, an index that includes foreign equities that are traded on U.S. exchanges, including in the form of 
ADRs, is included in my sample. In contrast, an index that includes securities listed on “developed country 
exchanges” is excluded, since it includes foreign equities listed on foreign exchanges. I also exclude 
indices designed to track equities that represent regions that extend beyond the United States, including 
“World,” “Developed Countries,” and “North America.” I also identify and remove a few indices that 
exclude U.S. firms that were missed in prior screens. 
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Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the number of funds as well 
as the aggregate AUM benchmarked to each index. Table 2 presents the most 
popular indices, measured both by number of funds that use it as a benchmark 
and by the aggregate AUM of the funds benchmarked to it. 
 
 Table 2 highlights the dominant position of the S&P 500 in this market. 
Out of a total of 3,206 funds, 842 (26%) are benchmarked to the S&P 500. This 
dominance is even greater in AUM terms, where the figures are almost $4 
trillion, or 41% of the total. Of course, that still leaves over $5.7 trillion, and 
almost 2,400 funds, benchmarking to some other index. Moreover, as Table 1 
demonstrates, there is a long tail of indices. The median index—and even the 
75th percentile index—is being used by only a single fund,69 and even the 90th 
 
 69.   This figure actually understates this phenomenon. In fact, 477 indices were being 
used by a single fund, representing 79.4% of the total. An additional 56 indices were used by only 2 funds, 
meaning that almost 89% of indices were benchmarking no more than 2 funds. 
Table 2: Most Popular Indices (Full Sample) 
 
Most Popular Indices by Number of Funds Most Popular Indices by AUM 
Index Name Number 
of Funds 
Index Name Aggregate 
AUM 
(billion) 
S&P 500  842 S&P 500   $3,989  
Russell 2000  234 CRSP U.S. Total Market   $797  
Russell 1000 Value  188 Russell 1000 Value   $603  
Russell 1000 Growth  183 Russell 1000 Growth   $532  
Russell 2000 Value  134 Russell 2000   $328  
Russell 2000 Growth  118 Russell Mid Cap Value   $204  
Russell Mid Cap Growth  82 Russell Mid Cap Growth   $203  
Russell Mid Cap Value  81 Russell 3000   $186  
Russell 3000  80 Russell 2000 Value   $181  
Russell 1000  79 Russell 1000   $178  
S&P MidCap 400  56 S&P MidCap 400   $155  
Russell 2500  54 Russell 3000 Growth   $138  
Russell Mid Cap  48 Russell 2000 Growth   $131  
Russell 3000 Value  43 CRSP U.S. Mid Cap   $110  
Russell 3000 Growth  40 Russell Mid Cap   $101  
Russell 2500 Growth  30 CRSP U.S. Small Cap   $97  
Russell 2500 Value  27 CRSP U.S. Large Cap 
Growth  
 $83  
NASDAQ 100  22 Russell 3000 Value   $83  
S&P SmallCap 600  22 NASDAQ 100   $76  
DJ Industrial Average  16 S&P Completion   $73  
    
Total number of funds  3,206 Total AUM $9,726 
This table presents the twenty most popular indices within the sample, as measured by the 
number of funds using the index (left panel) and the aggregate AUM (in billions of dollars) 
invested in funds using the index (right panel). The last row of each panel presents the total 
numbers of funds and AUM associated with these twenty indices.   
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percentile is only being used by three funds, highlighting the tremendous skew 
in the data. That being said, even the smaller indices are associated with 
nontrivial amounts of money. The aggregate AUM associated with the median 
index is $267 million, and there are 193 indices that are associated with over $1 
billion in AUM. While they are clearly not as large as the S&P 500, these 
amounts are large enough that they should not be ignored. 
Because indices can act both as benchmarks and as an underlying index for 
the purpose of “index” investing, I divide my sample of mutual funds into index 
funds and non-index funds.70 Then, recognizing that an index fund could 
potentially track an index other than its primary prospectus benchmark, I 
obtained the prospectus for each index fund from the SEC’s EDGAR Mutual 
Fund database and hand-collected the underlying index for each fund.71 Out of 
912 index funds, I was able to locate prospectuses for 889 in this way.72 Twenty-
two of the remaining twenty-three were exchange-traded notes, and I obtained 
their prospectuses by other means, such as through the Morningstar website. The 
final one was a unit investment trust, and I obtained its prospectus from 
EDGAR.73 I omitted one fund because it was an actively managed ETF and 
therefore did not have an underlying index. I was therefore left with a final 
sample of 911 index funds. The set of non-index funds consisted of the remaining 
2,294 funds. 
To investigate the characteristics of indices used as benchmarks for actively 
managed mutual funds separately from the characteristics of indices used for 
“index investing,” I repeat the analysis in Table 1 and Table 2, this time splitting 
the sample between the two groups. I note that while I am relying on the 
Morningstar Direct data for the non-index fund subsample, I use my hand-
collected data for the index fund subsample. As a result, the data used in the two 
subsamples does not aggregate to the data used in the full sample. The results are 
presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Because some indices are used both as the 
benchmark for a non-index fund and as the underlying index by an index fund, 
these two groups overlap. Moreover, because it is possible for a fund to track an 
index that is different from its benchmark, the index fund subsample is not a 
proper subset of full sample. 
 
 
 70.   Specifically, I classify as “index funds” all funds that are coded as index funds or 
as ETFs by Morningstar Direct. All other funds are classified as non-index funds. 
 71.   The process for obtaining the prospectus data from EDGAR was as follows. First, I 
extracted a list of all the funds coded as index funds. I then searched for the fund by name on the EDGAR 
website and obtained the most recent prospectus. However, recognizing that the data were collected from 
Morningstar Direct in July 2017, and the searches on EDGAR were conducted in the middle of 2018, 
when there was a discrepancy between the index obtained using EDGAR and the index provided by 
Morningstar Direct, I repeated the search on EDGAR, and I relied on the information as of December 31, 
2017. 
 72.   I was not able to find a methodology document for the index associated with one of 
these funds. As above, in this case, I relied on the description of the index in the prospectus. 
 73.   This was the “Invesco QQQ Trust.” 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics – Indices (Subsamples)  
 
Panel A: Non-Index Funds Only   
Mean Standard Deviation 
Percentile Number 
of Indices 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Number of 
Funds 26.37 90.2 1 1 2 6 74 87 
Aggregate AUM 
(millions) 60,942 272,490 21 267 1,141 9,114 147,450 87 
         
Panel B: Index Funds Only  
Mean Standard Deviation 
Percentile Number 
of Indices 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Number of 
Funds 1.64 3.79 1 1 1 1 2 555 
Aggregate AUM 
(millions) 7,971 74,585 4 33 233 1,399 8,006 555 
This table presents the distribution of number of funds by index as well as the aggregate AUM invested in 
funds (in millions of dollars) by index. Panel A presents this information within the non-index fund sample. 
In this sample, the index refers to the primary prospectus benchmark. The first column Panel A presents the 
average number of funds per index as well as the average total AUM per index within the non-index fund 
sample. The second column of Panel A presents the standard deviations of the same. The third through 
seventh columns of Panel A present the 10th, 25th, 50th (i.e., the median), 75th, and 90th percentiles of the 
distributions. Panel B presents the same information within the index fund sample. In this sample, the index 
refers to the index that the fund tracks. 
 
Table 3 shows that the skew is present in both subsamples. However, there 
are substantial differences between the two groups. Panel A shows that there are 
87 different benchmark indices used by the 2,294 non-index funds in my sample, 
an average of about 26 funds per index. In contrast, the median number of funds 
per index is only 2, and even the 75th percentile index is the benchmark for only 
6 mutual funds. Arguably, the most striking feature of this distribution is its 
skewness: the skewness of the number of funds is over 6.7, and the skewness of 
the AUM is over 7.8. 
In contrast, the most striking feature of the results in Panel B is the 
relatively low number of funds per index across the board. The average number 
of funds per index is only 1.6 (with a median of 1), and even the 75th percentile 
in the first row is 1, indicating that over 75% of indices are being tracked by a 
single index fund. These distributions are also highly skewed, with a skewness 
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Table 4: Most Popular Indices (Subsamples) 
Panel A: Non-Index Funds Only 
Index Name Number of 
Funds 
Index Name Aggregate AUM 
(billion) 
S&P 500  769 S&P 500   $2,434  
Russell 2000  198 Russell 1000 Value   $542  
Russell 1000 Value  182 Russell 1000 Growth   $471  
Russell 1000 Growth  176 Russell 2000   $259  
Russell 2000 Value  132 Russell Mid Cap Growth   $193  
Russell 2000 Growth  116 Russell Mid Cap Value   $192  
Russell Mid Cap Growth (tied) 80 Russell 2000 Value   $170  
Russell Mid Cap Value (tied) 80 Russell 3000   $148  
Russell 3000  74 Russell 1000   $147  
Russell 1000  73 Russell 3000 Growth   $138  
Russell 2500  52 Russell 2000 Growth   $120  
Russell 3000 Value (tied) 43 Russell 3000 Value   $83  
Russell Mid Cap (tied) 43 Russell Mid Cap   $73  
Russell 3000 Growth  40 Russell 2500   $54  
Russell 2500 Growth  30 Russell 2500 Growth   $52  
Russell 2500 Value (tied) 27 S&P MidCap 400   $48  
S&P MidCap 400 (tied) 27 NASDAQ Composite   $21  
Russell Micro Cap  14 Russell 2500 Value   $19  
S&P 1500  9 S&P 500 Utilities   $16  
S&P 500 Value (tied) 8 S&P 500 Growth   $16  
S&P SmallCap 600 (tied) 8   
Total number of funds  2,294 Total AUM $5,302 
Panel B: Index Funds Only 
Index Name Number of 
Funds 
Index Name Aggregate AUM 
(billion) 
S&P 500  72 S&P 500   $1,545  
Russell 2000  35 CRSP U.S. Total Market   $797  
S&P MidCap 400  29 CRSP U.S. Mid Cap   $110  
NASDAQ 100  20 S&P MidCap 400   $107  
S&P SmallCap 600  15 CRSP U.S. Small Cap   $97  
DJ Industrial Average  12 CRSP U.S. Large Cap Growth   $83  
Russell 1000 Growth  7 NASDAQ 100   $76  
DJ U.S. Real Estate (tied)  6 S&P Completion   $73  
Russell 1000 (tied) 6 CRSP U.S. Large Cap Value   $73  
Russell 1000 Value (tied) 6 Russell 2000   $69  
Russell 3000 (tied)  6 DJ U.S. Total Stock Market   $63  
DJ U.S. Basic Materials (tied) 5 Russell 1000 Value   $61  
DJ U.S. Financial  5 Russell 1000 Growth   $61  
DJ U.S. Oil & Gas (tied) 5 S&P SmallCap 600   $56  
NASDAQ Biotechnology (tied) 5 
NASDAQ U.S. Dividend 
Achievers Select   $39  
Russell Mid Cap (tied) 5 Russell 3000   $38  
S&P 500 Growth (tied) 5 CRSP U.S. Small Cap Value   $34  
S&P 500 Value (tied) 5 S&P Financials Select Sector   $32  
S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & 
Production Select Industry (tied) 5 Russell 1000   $31  
S&P Regional Banks Select Industry 
(tied) 5 Russell Mid Cap   $28  
Total number of funds  911 Total AUM $4,424 
This table presents the twenty most popular indices within the sample, as measured by the number of funds using the index 
(left panel) and the aggregate AUM (in billions of dollars) in the funds using the index (right panel). The last row of each 
panel presents the total numbers of funds and AUM associated with these twenty indices. Panel A presents this information 
within the non-index fund sample. In this sample, the index refers to the primary prospectus benchmark. Panel B presents 
the same information within the index fund sample. In this sample, the index refers to the index that the fund tracks. 
 Passive in Name Only 
817 
Table 4 demonstrates that while there is substantial overlap between the 
dominant indices in both subsamples, that overlap is not complete. In particular, 
Panel A demonstrates the relative importance of growth and value indices 
(discussed in more detail below74) among the non-index funds as well as the 
dominance of Russell indices, which, after the S&P 500, make up the next 14 
most popular indices by AUM and the next 15 most popular by number of funds. 
While these indices also make up a substantial portion of Panel B—the index 
fund sample—there is markedly more variety among these indices, even among 
only the twenty most popular indices. As discussed in more detail in the next two 
subsections, this level of variety is even more striking among the large number 
of smaller indices in my sample.75 
 Interestingly, some of the indices in my sample, particularly those that are 
used by index funds, appear to have been created with the express purpose of 
being used for index investing. In other words, rather than creating an index fund 
based on a pre-existing index, in many cases, it was demand from prospective 
index fund creators that drove the creation of the underlying index.76 While there 
is nothing inherently wrong with this, it puts further pressure on the traditional 
idea of an index fund as being qualitatively different from an actively managed 
fund. 
B. Cataloguing the Methodology Documents 
Before even considering the substance of the indices, the index 
methodology documents themselves demonstrate a striking amount of 
heterogeneity. Some are extremely long and detailed, sometimes cross-
referencing several other documents. For example, the methodology document 
governing the Russell U.S. indices (including several of the indices—such as the 
Russell 2000—listed in Table 2 and Table 4) is fifty pages long and contains 
cross-references (complete with links) to ten other documents.77 The documents 
contain extremely detailed descriptions, including examples, of how the indices 
 
 74.   See infra Section II.C.3.a. 
 75.   See infra Sections II.B and II.C. 
 76.   Sometimes this is stated explicitly in the fund prospectus. For example, the 
December 22, 2017, summary prospectus for the “Deep Value ETF,” which tracks the “TWM Deep Value 
Index” notes that “[t]he Index was created in 2014 in anticipation of the commencement of operations of 
the Fund.” Deep Value ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form N-1A) 4 (Dec. 22, 2017). Other times, it is 
implied by the description provided in the prospectus. For example, the January 27, 2017 summary 
prospectus for the “Franklin LibertyQ U.S. Equity ETF” which tracks the “LibertyQ U.S. Large Cap 
Equity Index” states that the index “is a systematic, rules-based proprietary index maintained and 
calculated by FTSE Russell . . . based on the Russell 1000 Index using a methodology developed with 
Franklin Templeton to reflect Franklin Templeton’s desired investment strategy.” (emphasis added). 
Franklin LibertyQ U.S. Equity ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form N-1A) 4 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
 77.   FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL U.S. EQUITY INDEXES CONSTRUCTION AND 
METHODOLOGY V2.9 (Oct. 2017) (on file with author). 
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are constructed. While a modest amount of ambiguity remains in certain 
respects,78 overall the amount of detail in impressive. 
At the other end of the spectrum, some of the methodology documents are 
only a couple of pages long and provide almost no detail at all. For example, the 
“NASDAQ U.S. Dividend Achievers Select Index Methodology” (which 
appears in Panel B of Table 4) is less than three pages long, almost a page of 
which is taken up by a listing of the eight different versions of the index. The 
discussion of the eligibility criteria contains less than forty words and is 




Despite this less than voluminous description, the index is being used as an 
underlying index for funds with about $39 billion in aggregate AUM. 
The NASDAQ U.S. Dividend Achievers Select Index is not the only one to 
contain a reference to another index: I found that many indices did so. For 
example, it was common for one index to use the constituents of another index 
as a starting point. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this was particularly common within 
an index family. So, for example, several S&P indices referred back to the 
constituents of the S&P 500 as a starting point,80 and several members of the 
Russell family referred to the Russell 3000, 2000 or 1000.81 Perhaps more 
surprising are the indices that referred to the constituents of another index that 
 
 78.   Discussed infra Section II.D. 
 79.   NASDAQ, NASDAQ U.S. DIVIDEND ACHIEVERS SELECT INDEX METHODOLOGY 
(Apr. 2017) (on file with author). 
 80.   Examples include the S&P 500 Momentum Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P 
MOMENTUM INDICES METHODOLOGY (July 2017) (on file with author); S&P 500 Dividend Aristocrats 
Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P 500 DIVIDEND ARISTOCRATS METHODOLOGY (Feb. 2017) (on file 
with author), and the S&P 500 Catholic Values Index, see S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P 500 CATHOLIC 
VALUES INDEX METHODOLOGY (July 2017) (on file with author). 
 81.   FTSE RUSSELL, supra note 77. In fact, the Russell 2000 and 1000 are themselves 
subsets of the Russell 3000. See also the Russell “Pure Style,” where the methodology refers back to the 
“parent” indices. FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL PURE STYLE INDEX SERIES v2.1 (Aug. 2017) (on file with 
author). 
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was not a member of the same index family.82 For example, each of the six 
Oppenheimer indices in my sample use an S&P index as its starting point.83  
To more systematically investigate the heterogeneity across indices, I 
coded all the indices in my sample for a variety of factors. These factors are 
primarily intended to help to categorize the indices according to how they may 
be used, or perceived, by market participants. In other words, this classification 
is intended to capture what the index purports to be, according to its methodology 
document. These characteristics are summarized in Table 5 for the full sample, 
and by index and non-index funds in Table 6.84 
First, I coded whether or not an index is an “industry” or “sector” index, in 
the sense that its constituents are restricted to a particular industry or sector. 
Surprisingly, 232 of the 601 indices—nearly 40%—satisfied this criterion, 
despite the fact that only 345 of the funds (representing a total AUM of over 
$400B) benchmarked to these indices. I also identified a further 21 indices 
(corresponding to 21 funds, and a total AUM of over $3B) that I call “exclusive 
industry indices”—rather than focusing on a particular industry or sector, these 
indices exclude securities from a particular industry. 
Next, I coded the indices for size, including mega, large, medium, small, 
and micro-cap, as well as broad indices and combinations of sizes (such as large- 
and medium-cap, or medium- and small-cap). Broad indices were the most 
common, followed by large-cap (261 and 186 indices, respectively). 
Interestingly, while these two size categories also represented a large number of 
funds (562 and 1,560, respectively), proportionately, there was a larger number 
 
 82.   I also note that the relationship between index families and fund families is complex. 
It is not uncommon for index funds from different fund families to track indices provided by the same 
index family. The most obvious examples of these would be the plethora of funds that track members of 
the S&P and Russell index families. Perhaps more surprisingly, different index funds within the same 
fund family sometimes track indices created by different index families. To choose just one example, 
while several of the funds in my sample issued by the Fidelity Salem Street Trust track indices that are 
part of the Russell family, a few track MSCI indices. For example, according to its December 2017 
prospectus documents, the Fidelity SAI U.S. Minimum Volatility Index Fund tracked the MSCI USA 
Minimum Volatility Index. Fidelity SAI U.S. Minimum Volatility Index Fund, Summary Prospectus 
(Form N-1A) (Dec. 30, 2017). This is the case even though there is a low volatility index within the 
Russell family: the Russell 1000 Low Volatility Focused Factor Index. This second index was, during this 
time, tracked by a different fund—the SPDR Russell 1000 Low Volatility Focus ETF. SPDR Russell 1000 
Low Volatility Focus ETF, Summary Prospectus (Form N-1A) 11 (Oct. 27, 2017). There could be several 
reasons for this phenomenon, including competition within the industry. 
 83.   Specifically, three use the S&P 500 Index. See OFI Revenue Weighted ESG Index, 
OFI REVENUE WEIGHTED ESG INDEX, OPPENHEIMERFUNDS 2 (Oct. 2017) (on file with author); OFI 
Revenue Weighted Financials Sector Index, OFI Revenue Weighted Financials Sector Index, 
OPPENHEIMERFUNDS 2 (Oct. 2017) (on file with author); OFI Revenue Weighted Large Cap Index, OFI 
REVENUE WEIGHTED LARGE CAP INDEX, OPPENHEIMERFUNDS 2 (Oct. 2017) (on file with author). One 
uses the S&P MidCap 400 Index (the OFI Revenue Weighted Mid Cap Index), one uses the S&P 
SmallCap 600 Index (the OFI Revenue Weighted Small Cap Index), and one uses the S&P 900 (the OFI 
Revenue Weighted Ultra Dividend Index), which is itself composed of the constituents of the S&P 500 
and the S&P MidCap 400. See S&P DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 41, at 3. 
 84.   While I made every effort to code the documents as consistently as possible, I 
recognize that any attempt to classify these indices is likely to be somewhat subjective. This risk is 
exacerbated by the fact that, as discussed, there is very little consistency across methodology documents. 
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of medium-sized funds (968) than there were indices (97), indicating that on 
average, the medium sized indices are being used as benchmarks for more funds. 
Roughly the same amount of money was benchmarked to both broad and 
medium-sized indices ($1.9 trillion and $1.7 trillion, respectively), while 
substantially more was benchmarked against large indices ($5.8 trillion), chiefly 
because of the importance of the S&P 500 (representing about $4 trillion of that). 
 
Table 5: Index Characteristics (Full Sample) 
 






Industry Industry Index 232 345  $413 Exclusive Industry 21 21  $3  
Size* 
Broad 261 562  $1,860  
Mega 12 16  $14  
Large 186 1560  $5,849  
Medium 97 968  $1,735  
Small 61 100  $381  
Micro 8 30  $6  
Other 11 11  $7  
Style 
Value/Growth 179 1,152  $2,594  
Dividend 61 71  $169  
Beta 11 11  $4  
Momentum 87 89  $27  
Earnings 62 67  $43  
Size 32 34  $6  
Volatility 53 61  $49  
Quality 86 89  $40  
At Least One 310 1,300  $2,812  
Specialized Specialized Index 178 191  $130  Proprietary Index 87 88  $82  
       
Total  601 3,206  $9,726 
This table summarizes the characteristics of the indices in the sample. The first column 
presents the number of indices coded as having the relevant characteristic. The second 
presents the total number of funds associated with these indices, and the third presents 
the aggregate AUM (in billions of dollars) invested in those funds. Note that many of 
these characteristics are overlapping. For example, an index may be both a value index 
and an industry-specific index, or a large-cap dividend index.  
*Some indices were intended to capture more than one size segment (for example, small 
and medium). While these were coded separately, for the purposes of this table, they 
are included in all of the relevant size segments. As a result, the figures in this table may 
not correspond to those in the text. 
 
I also coded indices for “style,” something that I borrow from the mutual 
fund and hedge fund literature. A style represents a particular investment 
strategy. Balancing parsimony with granularity, I focus on eight such styles: 
value/growth, momentum, size, beta, dividends, volatility, earnings, and 
“quality.” The first four represent the four most prominent asset pricing factors, 
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while the fifth style appears to be related to one of the more recently added 
pricing factors.85 I included the remaining three for two reasons. First, in my 
initial review of the methodology documents, they were quite common, leading 
me to suspect that they might be popular across the indices more broadly. This 
suspicion appears to be borne out by the data, as Table 5 makes clear. Second, 
while there is no clear theoretical reason why investors should care about these 
three factors, they all have a sufficiently clear and uncontroversial meaning that 
I felt that they could be coded consistently. I discuss each style in more detail in 
the next Section. 
In the full sample, by far the most popular of these styles was value/growth, 
representing 179 indices, which were associated with 1,152 funds (with a total 
AUM of about $2.6 trillion). This disproportionate popularity exists in both 
subsamples, albeit in slightly different ways: In the non-index subsample, they 
constitute 21 indices (almost a quarter of the indices in the subsample) 
representing 936 funds (over 40%) and over $2 trillion of AUM (38% of the 
total). In the index fund subsample, value/growth indices make up an even larger 
fraction of the number of indices (over 30%), but they make up a somewhat 
smaller fraction of the number of funds and AUM (24% and 13%, respectively). 
The other styles were less popular, and each was associated with between 11 and 
87 indices (between 11 and 89 funds, and about $4 billion and $170 billion of 
AUM). There was substantial overlap between styles—for example, I coded 50 
indices as both value/growth and momentum, corresponding to 51 funds and an 
aggregate AUM of over $17 billion. In total, I found that 310 indices purported 
to correspond to at least one of the eight styles, representing 1,300 funds and a 
little over $2.8 trillion. 
 In general, I make no judgement as to whether or not an index is a “good” 
style index. For example, if an index purports to be a growth index, I do not pass 
judgment as to whether or not its methodology is likely to capture the “growth” 
factor as it is commonly understood in the finance literature. However, I do 
include indices that purport to use standard value/growth proxies—such as 
price/book ratios—in this category. 
Finally, I recorded information about “specialized” or “bespoke” indices. 
These include indices that rely on a confidential or proprietary methodology, as 
well as those that employ a highly specialized strategy. I coded 178 indices as 
“specialized” in some way, which corresponded to 191 funds (for a total AUM 
of $130 billion). While the overwhelming majority of these specialized indices 







 85.   See discussion infra Section II.C.3 for more detail. 
Yale Journal on Regulation                                                             Vol. 36, 2019  
822 
Table 6: Index Characteristics 
 Non-Index Funds Only Index Funds Only 
 













Industry Industry Index 30 48 $49  210 297  $364  Exclusive Industry 0 --  -- 21 21  $3  
Size* 
Broad 34 215  $428  242 348  $1,432  
Mega 1 1  <$1  12 15  $14  
Large 23 1,243  $3,652  174 315  $2,195  
Medium 15 791  $1,190  93 176  $545 
Small 7 16  $29  58 85  $352  
Micro 5 26  $5  4 4  $1  
Other 3 3  $6  8 8  $1  
Style 
Value/Growth 21 936  $2,016  169 215  $578  
Dividend 4 5  $7  60 66  $162  
Beta 0 --  --  11 11  $4  
Momentum 1 1  $5  86 88  $21  
Earnings 3 3  $1  60 64  $42  
Size 0 -- --  32 34  $6  
Volatility 4 4  $1  51 57  $48  
Quality 2 2  $1  84 87  $39  
At least One 28 944  $2,024  297 355  $789  
Specialized Specialized Index 9 9  $6  174 183  $125  Proprietary Index 1 1  <$1  87 87  $82  
Total  87 2,294  $5,302  555 911  $4,424  
This table summarizes the characteristics of the indices in the sample. The first column presents the number of indices coded 
as having the relevant characteristic. The second presents the total number of funds associated with these indices, and the third 
presents the aggregate AUM (in billions of dollars) invested in those funds. Note that many of these characteristics are 
overlapping. For example, an index may be both a value index and an industry-specific index, or a large-cap dividend index. 
Panel A presents this information within the non-index fund sample. In this sample, the index refers to the primary prospectus 
benchmark. Panel B presents the same information within the index fund sample. In this sample, the index refers to the index 
that the fund tracks. 
*Some indices were intended to capture more than one size segment (for example, small and medium). While these were coded 
separately, for the purposes of this table, they are included in all of the relevant size segments. As a result, the figures in this 
table may not correspond to those in the text. 
In addition to recording these index types, I read each methodology 
document with an eye toward recording their material characteristics. In 
particular, I was interested in aspects of the methodologies that made it hard for 
a third party to replicate the index based on publicly available data. I discuss this 
in more detail below in Section II.D. 
C. Index Heterogeneity 
The differences in the presentation of the methodology documents, while 
substantial, are just the tip of the iceberg. My investigation of the methodology 
documents uncovered enormous heterogeneity even within indices that are 
designed to capture the same fundamentals. For the purposes of this discussion, 
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I consider all indices in my sample: those that are used by index funds as well as 
those used by non-index funds. 
1. Industry 
One domain in which one might expect to find relatively little heterogeneity 
is in the classification of industries for the purpose of creating industry indices. 
While it is no doubt the case that some firms straddle multiple industries, this 
problem arises under any classification scheme. In the United States, SIC codes, 
which have since been supplanted by NAICS codes, already exist for this 
purpose. SIC codes and NAICS codes are routinely used by both academic 
researchers and governmental agencies to classify firms.86 
Interestingly, despite the dominance of SIC and NAICS codes in other 
areas, most industry indices do not rely on these classification schemes. Instead, 
many rely on proprietary sector or industry classifications, and there is no 
consistent definition across index providers. For example, consider the retail 
sector. It turns out that NASDAQ, NYSE, MVIS, and S&P each have an index 
of the U.S. retail market.87 Surprisingly, each of these indices appears to rely on 
a different classification method—the NASDAQ index relies on “ICB Codes,”88 
the NYSE index uses an “NYSE proprietary screening,”89 the S&P index uses 
the “Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS),”90 and the MVIS is silent 
as to its classification methodology.91 With the exception of the MVIS 
classification scheme, which I cannot observe at all, each of these classification 
schemes is proprietary. The upshot of this is that, not only could the definition 
of, for example, “retail,” differ across indices, it is difficult to predict how this 
definition might vary. 
2. Size 
There is also substantial disagreement about the definitions of size across 
indices. For example, within the Russell family, the large-cap index is the Russell 
1000, which captures the 1000 largest stocks, while the S&P’s large-cap index—
 
 86.   See generally Executive Office of the President, North American Industry 
Classification System, OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET 3 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MZX9-PTD9]. 
 87.   These are the NASDAQ U.S. Smart Retail Index, the Dynamic Retail Intellidex 
Index, the MVIS U.S. Listed Retail Index, and the S&P Retail Select Industry Index, respectively. 
 88.   NASDAQ, NASDAQ U.S. SMART SECTOR INDEX FAMILY METHODOLOGY (July 
2016) (on file with author). 
 89.   NYSE ARCA, INTELLIDEX METHODOLOGY, VERSION 2.0 (Aug. 2016) (on file with 
author). 
 90.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P SELECT INDUSTRY INDICES METHODOLOGY (Sept. 
2016) (on file with author). 
 91.   MVIS, INDEX GUIDE, MVIS GLOBAL EQUITY INDICES, VERSION 5.61 (Sept. 2017) 
(on file with author). 
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the S&P 500 index—uses 500 stocks. As of May 31, 2018, the total market cap 
of the median security on the S&P 500 was $20.6 billion,92 compared to a much 
more modest $10.6 billion on the Russell 1000.93 The same is true with respect 
to medium- and small-cap stocks. On the same date, the total market cap of the 
median constituent on the S&P’s mid-cap index—the S&P MidCap 400—was 
$4.3 billion,94 compared to $8.2 billion for the Russell Midcap Index.95 In the 
small-cap space, these figures were $1.3 billion for the S&P SmallCap 60096 and 
$0.9 billion for Russell’s small-cap index, the Russell 2000.97 While I made 
every effort to code consistently, I recognize that my coding will inevitably be a 
rough proxy. 
An even bigger issue arises in the context of “broad” indices. Rather than 
attempting to act as the arbiter of what constitutes a sufficiently broad swath of 
the equity market, I classify any index that does not specifically target a size 
segment as a “broad” index. Nevertheless, I note that I found very different size 
thresholds among the indices I classified as “broad.” 
3. Style 
There was even more heterogeneity across the style indices. Even at a fairly 
basic level, different indices approached the problem of how to create a style tilt 
in different ways. For example, some indices generated their desired style tilt 
entirely through weighting: while all securities in the consideration set were 
included, they were weighted according to the index’s style score. Others chose 
to retain a more standard weighting scheme (such as value weighting), while 
selecting securities based on a style score. Naturally, some do both.98 
a) Value/Growth 
As discussed above, the most popular style among the eight I coded for, by 
any metric, was value/growth. This is not particularly surprising: the value 
anomaly is among the most robust and well-known asset pricing anomalies.99 
 
 92.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, supra note 41, at 1. 
 93.   FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL 1000 INDEX FACTSHEET 1 (May 31, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
 94.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P MIDCAP 400 FACTSHEET 1 (May 31, 2018) (on file 
with author). 
 95.   FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL MIDCAP INDEX FACTSHEET 1 (May 31, 2018) (on file 
with author). 
 96.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P SMALLCAP 600 FACTSHEET 1 (May 31, 2018) (on 
file with author). 
 97.   FTSE RUSSELL, RUSSELL 2000 INDEX FACTSHEET 1 (May 31, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
 98.   One example of this is the S&P Low Volatility family of indices, which includes 
the S&P 500 Low Volatility Index. S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P LOW VOLATILITY INDICES 
METHODOLOGY (Aug. 2017) (on file with author). 
 99.   Clifford S. Asness, Tobias J. Moskowitz & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Value and 
Momentum Everywhere, 68 J. FIN. 929 (2013). 
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Since it was made famous by Fama and French in their 1993 article,100 it has 
become a staple of both academics101 and investors. For example, a large-scale 
representative study of U.S. individuals conducted in December 2016 found that 
fifty-eight percent of Americans expected value stocks to have different level of 
risk from that of growth stocks, and fifty-three percent expected them to have 
different returns going forward.102 In the academic finance literature, a “value” 
stock is generally defined as a stock with a relatively high book-to-market ratio. 
In other words, these are the stocks of companies that have a market 
capitalization that is relatively low compared to the accounting value of the 
company’s assets. Conversely, a growth stock is generally defined as a stock 
with a relatively low book-to-market ratio. These are the stocks of companies 
that have a market capitalization that is relatively high compared to the 
accounting value of the company’s assets.103 
Because value and growth are two sides of the same conceptual coin, I 
coded them into the same category. In order to ensure that I did not miss any 
indices that used different terminology, I also included those that described 
themselves as relying on price-to-book variables. Even allowing for this, there 
was a tremendous amount of heterogeneity across the different indices in this 
category. Despite the fact that there is a standard definition of value/growth in 
the academic literature, there is substantial heterogeneity in the way that the 
scores are computed across indices. 
For example, the StrataQuant family of indices, which includes nine indices 
benchmarking an aggregate total of over $8.7 billion in AUM, scores eligible 
securities based on what it calls “value” and “growth” factors.104 One of the value 
factors—price-to-book value—follows the standard definition of the value, and 
a second—price-to-cash flow—is at least consistent with the idea of comparing 
price to some fundamental. The third and final value factor—return on assets—
is more puzzling and appears to be capturing something distinct from the 
traditional definition of value. Even more perplexing are the “growth” factors. 
Theoretically, growth is simply the other end of value—rather than being 
separate concepts, a security with a very low value score could simply be 
interpreted as a growth stock. This is not what StrataQuant does. Instead, it 
defines five different growth factors: 3-, 6- and 12-month price appreciation, 
 
 100.   Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on 
Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1993). 
 101.   Sebastien Betermier, Laurent E. Calvet & Paolo Sodini, Who Are the Value and 
Growth Investors?, 72 J. FIN. 5 (2017). 
 102.   James J. Choi & Adriana Z. Robertson, What Matters to Individual Investors? 
Evidence from the Horse’s Mouth 57 tbl.15 (NBER Working Paper No. 25019, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25019.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9WJ-XQXB]. 
 103.   The term growth follows from this low book-to-market ratio, since this low ratio 
can be interpreted as implying that the market expects the price to rise relatively quickly, thereby bringing 
this ratio up toward the median. 
 104.   NYSE, STRATAQUANT INDEX FAMILY VERSION 2.2 (Sept. 2015) (on file with 
author). 
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price-to-sales ratio, and 1-year sales growth. The first three are likely to be 
capturing momentum rather than the traditional “growth” factor, and the fourth 
is likely to be highly correlated with the price to cash flow measure used as a 
value factor. Conceptually, the fifth factor appears to be some hybrid of the other 
four. There is nothing necessarily wrong with selecting stocks based on these 
criteria; as discussed in the next Section, momentum is a highly robust factor. 
The point is simply that many of these factors are capturing something quite 
different from the standard value/growth factors. 
StrataQuant is hardly unique in this regard. For example, the Intellidex 
methodology, used by, inter alia, the Dynamic Large Cap Value Intellidex, also 
constructs separate value and growth factors based on different metrics.105 In the 
case of Intellidex, these metrics are (1) price/forecasted earnings, (2) price/book, 
(3) price/sales, (4) price/cash flow, and (5) dividend yield for the value factor, 
and (1) long-term projected earnings growth, (2) earnings growth, (3) sales 
growth, (4) cash flow growth, and (5) book value growth for the growth factor. 
Again, only some of these metrics align with the traditional understanding of 
growth and value in the finance literature. 
While this general pattern holds across a wide variety of the indices I 
examined, one outlier stands out. The Morningstar U.S. Market Factor Tilt Index 
simply uses the Fama-French 1993 factors.106 As a result, this is likely to be far 
closer to the traditional definition of “value.” 
b) Momentum 
The second most popular style, at least in terms of number of indices or 
funds, was momentum. Interestingly, despite the fact that momentum rivals 
value in terms of robustness as an asset pricing anomaly,107 a far smaller dollar 
amount (about $27 billion) was associated with these indices. 
As with value and growth, in order to ensure that the measure was not 
underinclusive, I included certain indices that did not explicitly refer to 
themselves as capturing “momentum,” as long as they described themselves as 
relying on the path of historical returns.108 Because momentum is best measured 
by observing the path of past returns, including these indices allows me to more 
consistently capture the same conceptual style. Of course, one consequence of 
this is that I am also capturing things that we would not traditionally call 
momentum strategies, such as so-called “technical analysis” investing 
 
 105.   NYSE ARCA, supra note 89. 
 106.   MORNINGSTAR, CONSTRUCTION RULES FOR THE MORNINGSTAR U.S. MARKET 
FACTOR TILT INDEX (Dec. 2015) (on file with author). 
 107.   Asness et al., supra note 99, at 930. 
 108.   I did not include indices that used something like price appreciation in constructing 
what they called a value or growth factor. As a result, for example, the StrataQuant indices would not be 
included. 
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strategies.109 As such, even the relatively small dollar value associated with this 
category likely overstates the prominence of true momentum indices. 
While there was somewhat less heterogeneity among the momentum 
indices, they were far from consistent. For example, rather than simply using 6- 
or 12-month returns, the MSCI U.S.A. Momentum Index normalizes each of 
these two measures by the “annualized Standard Deviation of weekly local price 
returns over the period of 3 years.”110 It then standardizes each of these two 
measures111 and averages them to compute a security-level score. Other indices 
are harder to evaluate because of a lack of specificity in the methodology 
document. For example, the Dorsey Wright Technical Leaders Index document 
states only that eligible securities “are ranked using a proprietary relative 
strength (momentum) measure. Each security’s score is based on intermediate 
and long-term price movements relative to a representative market 
benchmark.”112 
c) Dividends 
Another very popular style related to dividends. As measured by aggregate 
AUM, this was the second most popular style. From a theoretical level, this is 
somewhat puzzling. Financial economists have long questioned the economic 
value of dividends.113 While some explanations for the phenomenon (both 
rational and behavioral) exist,114 it is not clear that they would predict that about 
$170 billion be benchmarked to dividend-related indices, particularly in light of 
 
 109.   Technical analysis is an investment strategy that involves analyzing past price 
patterns to forecast future returns. See, e.g., Lee Bohl & Randy Fredrick, How to Pick Stocks Using 
Fundamental & Technical Analysis, CHARLES SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/active-
trader/insights/content/stock-selection-using-fundamental-technical-analysis [https://perma.cc/D9NU-
Q5YY] (“[T]echnical analysis . . . focuses on patterns within stock charts as a way to try to forecast future 
pricing and volume trends.”). 
 110.   MSCI, MSCI MOMENTUM INDEXES METHODOLOGY 4-5 (June 2017) (on file with 
author). 
 111.   Standardizing consists of subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation. The values are then winsorized at +/- 3. Id. at 5. 
 112.   NASDAQ, DORSEY WRIGHT TECHNICAL LEADERS INDEX FAMILY 
METHODOLOGY 4 (Apr. 2017) (on file with author). 
 113.   See, e.g., Laurie Simon Bagwell & John B. Shoven, Cash Distributions to 
Shareholders, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 129 (1989) (noting that “[e]conomists have long been puzzled 
by why firms pay dividends”); H. Kent Baker & Gary E. Powell, How Corporate Managers View 
Dividend Policy, 38 Q.J. BUS. & ECON. 17 (1999) (noting that “[d]ividend policy is one of the most 
controversial subjects in finance”); H. Kent Baker, Gary E. Powell & E. Theodore Veit, Revisiting the 
Dividend Puzzle, 11 REV. FIN. ECON. 241 (2002) [hereinafter Baker et al., Revisiting] (noting that 
“[d]espite exhaustive theoretical and empirical analysis to explain their pervasive presence, dividends 
remain one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate finance”). 
 114.   See Baker et al., Revisiting, supra note 113 (surveying various explanations that 
have been proposed). Of course, despite the fact that financial economists find dividends puzzling, it 
remains possible that, for whatever reason, investors want to invest in mutual funds that contain dividend 
paying stocks. In that case, the popularity of dividend indices could simply reflect this demand by 
investors. For example, some investors might like to receive regular cash payments from their mutual 
fund investments, but they might not want to invest in bond funds or to regularly liquidate some proportion 
of their investment. 
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the fact that less than 1/6 of this value is benchmarked to momentum, something 
that is unambiguously associated with returns. 
While the heterogeneity is, perhaps unsurprisingly, less extreme in this 
context, the indices are still not entirely consistent. For example, indices rely on 
different horizons of past dividend payments. Whereas the Wisdom Tree Indices 
use the past twelve months,115 some of the NASDAQ indices use the past ten 
years.116 
d) Volatility 
Like dividends, the existence of indices relating to volatility is something 
of a puzzle. As a general matter, finance theory teaches that an asset’s (or a 
portfolio’s) volatility—i.e., variance—should not, on its own, be relevant to 
investors. Instead, what ought to matter is how well that asset (or portfolio) does 
when the investor really needs the money. If asset A has a high volatility but 
tends to do well at times when an investor really needs the money, we would 
expect her to prefer it to asset B, which has a relatively low volatility but tends 
to do poorly when she really needs the money.117 While this statement seems 
accurate, there may be instances in which investors do care about volatility per 
se. For example, Moreira and Muir argue that portfolios that scale monthly 
returns by the inverse of their previous month’s variance can, among other 
things, be attractive to certain types of investors.118 
While volatility is among the most standard measures in finance, even here 
there was substantial heterogeneity. Some indices took a fairly standard 
approach. For example, the S&P low volatility indices—S&P 500 Low Volatility 
Index, the S&P MidCap 400 Low Volatility Index, and the S&P SmallCap 600 
Low Volatility Index—select a predetermined number of stocks from the 
appropriate parent index based on realized volatility over the past year.119 These 
securities are then weighted by the reciprocal of this volatility measure, so that 
the least volatile securities receive the most weight. 
In addition to “low” volatility indices there are also so-called “minimum 
volatility” indices. These indices seek to minimize the volatility of the index 
portfolio, subject to certain constraints. These tend to rely on proprietary 
 
 115.   WISDOMTREE, WISDOMTREE RULES-BASED METHODOLOGY, DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL DIVIDEND INDEXES 3 (June 2017) (on file with author). 
 116.   Two examples of this are the NASDAQ U.S. Broad Dividend Achievers Index, 
NASDAQ U.S. BROAD DIVIDEND ACHIEVERS INDEX METHODOLOGY 2 (Nov. 2013) (on file with author) 
and the NASDAQ U.S. Dividend Achievers Select Index, supra note 79, at 2. 
 117.   In a nationally representative survey, Choi and Robertson find that a “[c]oncern 
that when I especially need the money, the stock market will tend to drop” is a very or extremely important 
factor for over 35% of individuals and is at least a moderately important factor for almost 61%. Choi & 
Robertson, supra note 102, at 42 tbl.1. 
 118.   Alan Moreira & Tyler Muir, Volatility-Managed Portfolios, 72 J. FIN. 1611 
(2017). 
 119.   S&P LOW VOLATILITY INDICES METHODOLOGY, supra note 98. 
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“optimizers,” making their construction relatively opaque. Two examples of 
such indices are the S&P 500 Minimum Volatility Index and the MSCI U.S.A. 
Minimum Volatility Index. The former relies on the “Northfield Open 
Optimizer,”120 and the latter relies on the “Barra Optimizer.”121 
e) Earnings and “Quality” 
Indices related to earnings were also fairly popular, at least measured in 
terms of aggregate AUM. Included in the group are indices that purport to 
capture factors related to revenue, sales, operating cash flows, as well as earnings 
generally. 
Perhaps related to earnings was a somewhat amorphous factor generally 
described as “quality.” Unfortunately, quality is not a term that is commonly 
used in the finance literature, and it lacks a precise definition. Based on my 
reading of the methodology documents, it appears to capture some combination 
of revenue growth and/or stability, profitability, levels of cash on hand, and debt 
ratios. As such, I include indices that refer to these features. Because quality and 
earnings can both relate to revenue, there is some overlap between the two 
groups. Nevertheless, it is clear that quality is intended to capture more than just 
earnings, and it is possible that in some cases it may be related to the profitability 
factor in the Fama-French five-factor model.122 
Given the fact that quality is fairly amorphous, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that there is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in the way these indices are 
constructed. For example, for the purposes of the MSCI U.S.A. Quality Index, 
quality was measured by a combination of (1) return on equity (trailing twelve-
month earnings per share divided by latest book value per share), (2) debt-to-
equity ratio (total debt divided by book value in the last fiscal year), and (3) 
earnings variability (the standard deviation of year-over-year earnings growth 
per share over the last five years).123 In contrast, the S&P 500 quality indices, 
including the S&P 500 Quality Index, measure quality through a combination of 
(1) accruals ratio, (2) financial leverage ratio, and (3) return on equity.124 While 
there is some overlap between these metrics, they are clearly distinct. Even more 
distinct is the definition employed by Northern Trust in its indices.125 While its 
 
 120.   S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P MINIMUM VOLATILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY 
(July 2017) (on file with author). 
 121.   MSCI Minimum Volatility Index Methodology, MSCI (Sept. 2017) (on file with 
author). 
 122.   Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. 
FIN ECON. 1 (2015). 
 123.   MSCI QUALITY INDEXES METHODOLOGY, MSCI 9 (June 2017) (on file with 
author). 
 124.   S&P Quality Indices Methodology, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 16 (July 2017) (on 
file with author). 
 125.   These include the Northern Trust Quality Large Cap Index, the Northern Trust 
Quality Dividend Index, the Northern Trust Quality Dividend Defensive Index, and the Northern Trust 
Quality Dynamic Index. The aggregate AUM benchmarked to these four indices is almost $2.8 billion. 
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scoring model is proprietary, according to the methodology, its three “core 
components” are “Management Expertise (e.g., corporate finance activities), 
Profitability (e.g., assess the reliability and the sustainability of financial 
performance), and Cash Flow.”126 
f) Size and Beta 
Along with value/growth, the other two factors in the classic Fama-French 
asset pricing model are size and “market beta.” These two factors, however, were 
far less popular along all three dimensions (number of indices, number of funds, 
and aggregate AUM), and were seventh and eighth out of eight, respectively. 
The fact that size is relatively unpopular is not particularly surprising from a 
theoretical perspective. While there has historically been a “size” premium—
smaller companies were associated with higher returns—there is some question 
as to whether this premium still exists.127 Another possibility is that indices that 
focus on particular size segments could be acting as substitutes for indices that 
focus on a size as a style factor. 
The fact that “beta” is relatively unpopular is more interesting. In principle, 
an asset’s “beta” captures the component of that risk associated with that asset 
that is priced. In other words, the only way for asset A to have systematically 
higher returns than asset B is if asset A has a higher beta.128 In most practical 
applications, beta is computed with reference to some proxy for “the market.” 
As such, investors might find it useful to have access to an index that is designed 
to have a particular level of market risk. On the other hand, there is also evidence 
that high beta assets (not portfolios) tend to underperform, something that has 
been attributed to the fact that individual investors have difficulty taking 
leveraged positions.129 Another possibility is that investors have less need for 
indices designed around any particular beta, since one can always construct one 
from the return on any index with a known beta. Finally, it may be that, compared 
to other style factors, beta is less well known among the investing public, 
depressing demand for such indices. 
4.  “Specialized” or “Bespoke” Indices 
Finally, there are what I term the “bespoke” or “specialized” indices. In this 
category, I also include indices that rely on proprietary methodologies, since 
 
 126.   Northern Trust Quality Dividend Index Methodology, NORTHERN TRUST 4 (on file 
with author); Northern Trust Quality Large Cap Index Methodology, NORTHERN TRUST 3 (on file with 
author). 
 127.   See Mathijs A. Van Dijk, Is Size Dead? A Review of the Size Effect in Equity 
Returns, 35 J. BANKING & FIN 3263 (2011). 
 128.   See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, 
PRINCIPALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 881 (11th ed. 2014). 
 129.   Andrea Frazzini & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Betting Against Beta, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 
1 (2014). 
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there is no way of determining how they are constructed. These are generally 
used by only one or two funds and tend to have far less AUM benchmarked 
against them. However, while the values tend to be small on average, they add 
up. In total, the 171 indices I coded as “specialized” act as benchmarks for $130 
billion in AUM. Unsurprisingly, there is an enormous amount of variety across 
these indices. Some of these are clearly designed to appeal to certain groups of 
investors, such as the “S&P 500 Catholic Values Index,” the “Barclays Women 
in Leadership Index,” or the “SSGA Gender Diversity Index.” Others are 
included because they focus on a particular niche, such as the “Solactive Guru 
Index,” the “iBillionaire Index,” or the “WeatherStorm Forensic Account Long-
Short Index.” Still others are aimed at “responsible” investing. A final group of 
indices is included in this category primarily because they are constructed using 
proprietary methodologies, making them virtually impenetrable to outsiders. 
D. Transparency Versus Opacity 
The discussion in the prior Section also revealed another dimension of 
heterogeneity: the substantial variation in the amount of detail provided by the 
indices. This heterogeneity manifested itself in very different ways, including 
the selection criteria used by the index, the degree to which the underlying data 
required to construct the index were publicly available, and the description of an 
applicable governance or oversight body. Even within these categories, the 
amount of detail, or lack thereof, varied substantially across indices, and often 
even within index families. In this Section, I briefly address this issue. 
1. Selection Criteria 
We have already seen that the selection criteria varied substantially across 
indices. Perhaps more surprisingly, however, was the degree to which the 
amount of information provided about these selection criteria varied across 
indices. Some indices provided a detailed discussion of the selection criteria. For 
example, the methodology employed in constructing the CRSP family of 
indices—including the CRSP U.S. Total Market Index—is extensively 
documented, including extensive formulas, variable descriptions, and even 
figures.130 
Others, in contrast, were far more circumspect. For example, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average—another prominent index—selects constituents from a 
universe consisting of the securities on the S&P 500 using a selection process 
not based on quantitative criteria.131 Instead, “a stock typically is added only if 
the company has an excellent reputation, demonstrates sustained growth and is 
 
 130.   CRSP U.S. Equity Indexes Methodology Guide, CRSP CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN 
SECURITY PRICES (Dec. 2016) (on file with author). 
 131.   DOW JONES AVERAGES METHODOLOGY, supra note 47, at 5. 
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of interest to a large number of investors.”132 Similarly, the eighty-four indices 
employing “proprietary” methodologies are necessarily opaque to outsiders not 
privy to those proprietary methodologies. 
Other indices use selection criteria that are hard to replicate for other 
reasons. For example, while the “economic moat”133 rating employed by 
Morningstar is described in great detail in the “Morningstar Equity Research 
Methodology” document,134 it relies in large part on assessments made by 
analysts which cannot be easily replicated by following the description in the 
documentation. By contrast, as discussed above, the Russell 1000 and 2000 
indices are constructed using fairly clear cutoff rules.135 
2. Underlying Data 
Even a completely transparent or mechanical selection criteria can lead to 
an opaque index if the data required to determine whether the criteria are met 
are not clearly defined. While it is straightforward to obtain data on stock prices 
and trading data for companies listed on large exchanges, the same is not true 
with respect to much of the data relied upon in creating indices. 
Examples of such a lack of clarity can include vague references to things 
like “earnings,” without specifying which of the many available measures of 
earnings. Alternatively, because financial variables change over time, it is often 
crucial to know the reference date of the data in question. While some indices 
clearly indicate these reference dates, others do not. Finally, the sources of the 
data in question may not be obvious. For example, while the CRSP methodology 
identifies the source of all data used in constructing its Value and Growth Style 
indices,136 others do not. 
3. Rule Changes 
Another crucial feature of the index methodologies is the ability to change 
the methodology over time. At the limit, if an index’s rules are changing all the 
time, the index is, for practical purposes, an actively managed portfolio, and the 
rules themselves are meaningful only in an ex post sense. That is, rather than 
being useful for understanding what the index’s constituents might look like in 
the future, the methodology would only provide insights into what the 
constituents look like in the present (or perhaps in the past). 
 
 132.   Id. 
 133.   CONSTRUCTION RULES FOR THE MORNINGSTAR WIDE MOAT FOCUS INDEX, 
MORNINGSTAR (June 2016) (on file with author). 
 134.   MORNINGSTAR EQUITY RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, MORNINGSTAR 3 (Mar. 
2017) (on file with author). 
 135.   See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 136.   CRSP U.S. EQUITY INDEXES METHODOLOGY GUIDE, supra note 130, at 49-50. 
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Among the sample of indices that I studied, it is the norm for the 
methodology documents to empower the entity or group responsible for 
administering the index (often referred to as the index committee) to change the 
rules from time to time. This power is not just hypothetical. For example, as 
discussed in Section I.B, these rules change frequently among the two largest 
families of indices.137 Given that these are among the most rigorously 
documented and professionally managed indices in my sample, there is little 
reason to believe that other indices change less frequently. 
III. ETFs and Affiliated Indices 
Exchange-traded funds (commonly known as ETFs) represent one 
particular kind of “index investing.”138 The overwhelming majority of U.S. ETFs 
are index-based,139 meaning that their primary objective is to track an underlying 
index.140 While the general perception is that ETFs are “passive,” we have 
already seen that the perception of any index as passive is flawed. In the ETF 
context, however, this passivity can become even more tenuous. As I discovered 
upon reading the fund prospectuses, for a substantial fraction of funds in the U.S. 
market, the index that the ETF “passively” follows is itself created by the fund 
manager or an affiliate thereof. If any sort of index investing is delegated 
management, here, the delegation to the index provider is essentially 
indistinguishable from delegation to the fund manager. While such funds may 
be formally tracking the index in question, in practice, it is hard to see the 
difference between this and a fund that simply makes its own investment 
decisions directly. 
A. About ETFs 
Like mutual funds, ETFs are a form of pooled investment vehicle, and they 
are generally registered as investment companies under the Investment Company 
Act of 1940.141 As such, they are subject to SEC regulation, including disclosure 
and reporting requirements. There are, however, some differences between ETFs 
and traditional mutual funds. In a standard open-ended mutual fund, investors 
buy their shares directly from the fund. When they wish to sell, they sell their 
shares back to the fund at their net asset value (“NAV”), which is generally 
 
 137.   See discussion supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
 138.   For a detailed discussion of ETFs, including their structure and existing regulatory 
framework, see Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds, 
S. CAL. L. REV. 839 (2018). 
 139.   As I discuss in more detail in Section III.C, out of the 571 funds in my final sample 
of U.S. ETFs, 18 described themselves as “active” and did not track an index. See infra Section III.C. 
 140.   See Mutual Funds and ETFs: A Guide for Investors, supra note 25, at 19 (“Index-
based mutual funds and ETFs seek to track an underlying securities index and achieve returns that closely 
correspond to the returns of that index with low fees.”). 
 141.   15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2018). 
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calculated at the end of the day.142 In contrast, ETFs do not sell shares directly 
to investors. Instead, ETF shares are listed on national stock exchanges, where 
investors can buy and sell them throughout the day.143 Financial intermediaries, 
known as authorized participants, are the only entities allowed to buy shares 
directly from the fund or redeem them to the fund, and their trading ensures that 
the prices remain close to the value of the underlying assets in the fund.144 
B. Why Use an Affiliated Index? 
There are several potential reasons why a fund might decide to track an 
affiliated index. One benign possibility is cost-saving. Perhaps the fund manager 
can create an index that is just as good, in some meaningful sense, as a well-
known “brand name” index. If that is the case, rather than paying a licensing fee 
to the provider of the brand name index, the fund manager might simply make 
her own index. These savings can either be passed on to investors, retained by 
the fund manager, or divided between them. To the extent that any of this is 
passed on to investors, this explanation suggests that funds that rely on affiliated 
indices should exhibit lower expense ratios than other comparable funds. This 
explanation makes the most sense if investors are sophisticated and if they fully 
understand both the terms of the prospectus and the context of the market. 
On the other hand, if investors are unsophisticated, and either do not 
understand or do not carefully read the prospectus documents, things may not be 
so benign. For example, suppose that investors have internalized the idea that 
ETFs are a good investment option because they tend to have lower management 
fees and fewer agency costs than actively managed funds. Recognizing this, fund 
managers may create affiliated index-linked ETFs to cater to these investors. 
While these investors are sensitive to management fees, they do not pay attention 
to the details of the fund, including the fact that the fund is following an affiliated 
index. Managers may be able to take advantage of this by increasing their total 
compensation through other means, perhaps by charging the fund a high 
licensing fee for the privilege of using the index. In this case, we would expect 
 
 142.   See Mutual Funds and ETFs: A Guide for Investors, supra note 25, at 4-5. 
 143.   Id. at 6. 
 144.   Id. One distinct feature of ETFs—which differentiates them from both actively 
managed mutual funds and other index funds is that it is generally quite easy to determine, at any given 
time, the composition of the fund’s portfolio. While the SEC is currently considering changes to the 
regulation of ETFs, Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 33-10515, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 33140, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,332-411 (proposed June 28, 2018), at the time of this writing, 
such disclosure is not required of all ETFs under the securities laws. Rather, it is an industry norm, which 
may be related to the existence of the authorized purchasers mechanism. While the existence of portfolio 
information undoubtedly increases the transparency associated with ETFs, it does not fully replace the 
need for an understanding of the underlying index’s construction. While some investors may, with enough 
sophistication and effort, use this information to reverse-engineer the underlying index’s rules of 
construction, it is unlikely that the average retail investor will be in a position to do so. Moreover, if the 
underlying rules are changing over time, even sophisticated investors may find this extraordinarily 
difficult. 
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ETFs tracking affiliated indices to display the same management fees as other 
ETFs, but to find other ways to pass costs on to investors. These costs would 
show up in the fund’s expense ratios. 
Finally, investors may be totally unsophisticated. For example, as before, 
suppose investors don’t understand much about the market or the products, but 
they have heard that ETFs are a good investment because they are passive and 
therefore desirable. Fund managers may wish to cash in on this popularity, as 
well as this perception that they represent passive investments. If investors are 
driven primarily by this misplaced demand for “passive” funds, and not by other 
features of the fund (including management fees), managers may take advantage 
of this popularity and charge higher management fees. 
While the first explanation is benign, the latter two are more troubling. Both 
imply that investors mistakenly purchasing investment products that are not what 
they thought they were buying. The relative plausibility of these three 
explanations will likely depend on one’s view of the sophistication of retail 
investors. Fortunately, because the three families of explanations have different 
empirical implications, we can use these implications to construct tests of the 
underlying theories. This is what I do in the remainder of this Section. In the next 
Section, I discuss the data that I rely on, and in Section III.D, I perform my 
empirical analysis. Ultimately, I find evidence most consistent with the second 
explanation—that managers are taking advantage of the popularity of ETFs and 
that investors are primarily concerned with management fees. 
C. The Sample and Coding Methodology 
In order to get a handle on the phenomenon of affiliated index-linked ETFs, 
I began with all funds in the CRSP mutual fund database, which was obtained 
through WRDS.145 I retained all funds flagged as ETFs or ETNs. To ensure that 
I was capturing funds that focused on equities, I eliminated funds that had less 
than ninety percent of their portfolios invested in common stock as well as those 
that focused on non-U.S. investments.146 Because of the amount of time required 
to hand collect the data, prospectus data were collected only at a single point in 
time. For consistency, I therefore eliminated all results for which no data was 
available as of December 30, 2016. This left me with a total of 603 ETFs. 
 
 145.   I used CRSP rather than Morningstar Direct for this analysis because the CRSP 
data on fund fees and performance is much easier to work with than the Morningstar Direct data. The 
main benefit of the Morningstar Direct data is that it contains information on primary benchmark index. 
Because I hand-collected the index data in this Section, this benefit was not material, making CRSP the 
preferred data source. 
 146.   Specifically, I eliminated funds with the following Lipper objective types: 
“CHINA REGION FUNDS,” “EMERGING MARKETS FUNDS,” “EUROPEAN REGION FUNDS,” 
“INDIA REGION FUNDS,” “INTERNATIONAL FUNDS,” “INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE 
FUNDS,” “INTERNATIONAL SMALL-CAP FUNDS,” “JAPANESE FUNDS,” “LATIN AMERICAN 
FUNDS,” “PACIFIC EX JAPAN FUNDS,” and “PACIFIC REGION FUNDS.” 
Yale Journal on Regulation                                                             Vol. 36, 2019  
836 
I then searched the SEC’s EDGAR database to obtain prospectus data for 
each fund on my list. There were seventeen funds for which I was unable to find 
a match in EDGAR, despite attempting various versions of the fund name. I also 
omitted fifteen funds from my final database because they specialized in 
exclusively non-U.S. investments. After all of this, my final universe of U.S. 
equity ETFs consisted of 571 funds. 
To ensure consistency, I personally hand-collected, read, and coded each 
prospectus in my sample. I collected information on a variety of topics, including 
the (1) name of the index that the fund sought to track, (2) the index provider and 
whether or not the index provider was affiliated with the fund, including the 
advisor or subadvisor, and (3) whether the fund characterized itself as passive, 
and if so, how. 
Out of the 571 funds in my final sample, 81 were following an index that 
was created by an affiliate of the fund.147 Despite this fact, all 81 of these funds 
described themselves as passive in their prospectuses. In addition to these 81 
funds, I recorded 18 funds that explicitly described themselves as “active” or 
“actively managed” ETFs, which did not track any particular index. 
A few examples may help to clarify this phenomenon. Consider, for 
example, the VanEck Vectors Retail ETF, which, according to its February 1, 
2017 prospectus, tracks the MVIS U.S. Listed Retail 25 Index.148 The prospectus 
describes the fund as passive, stating that “[t]he Fund, using a ‘passive’ or 
indexing investment approach, attempts to approximate the investment 
performance of the Retail Index by investing in a portfolio of securities that 
generally replicates the [underlying index].”149 Later in the document, however, 
in the description of the indices, we are told that “[t]he Retail Index is the 
exclusive property of MVIS (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Adviser).”150 Or 
consider the SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, which, according to its 
October 31, 2017 prospectus, tracks the SSGA Gender Diversity Index151 and is 
“managed with a passive investment strategy.”152 According to the very same 
 
 147.   While I made every effort to code these consistently, this coding necessarily 
required some judgement. For example, in a few cases, I coded a fund as using an affiliated index even if 
it was calculated by a third party if the prospectus indicated that the fund, or an affiliate thereof, 
meaningfully controlled the index. For example, while S&P was described as the “sponsor” of the OFI 
Revenue Weighted Large Cap Index, which was tracked by the Oppenheimer Large Cap Revenue ETF, 
the prospectus indicated that “the Manager owns the Underlying Index,” and as a result, “it may be deemed 
a creator and sponsor of the Underlying Index.” Oppenheimer Large Cap Revenue ETF, Prospectus (Form 
N-1A) 25 (Oct. 27, 2017). None of the results in this section are sensitive to the exclusion of these indices 
from the analysis. 
 148.   VanEck Vectors Retail ETF, Prospectus (Form N-1A) 30 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
 149.   Id. 
 150.   Id. at 71. The document goes on to say that MVIS “has contracted with Solactive 
AG to maintain and calculate the Retail Index.” Id. 
 151.   SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, Prospectus (Form N-1A) 24 (Oct. 31, 
2017). 
 152.   Id. at 26. 
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document “[t]he [i]ndex was created and is sponsored by . . . an affiliate of the 
Fund and of . . . the Fund’s Adviser.”153 
D. Affiliated Indices and ETF Fees 
Having uncovered this puzzling phenomenon, I next explore the reasons 
behind it. In doing so, I return to the discussion in Section III.B, in which I 
developed several testable predictions based on three competing explanations. 
Under the first, most benign, explanation, we would expect to find that expense 
ratios are lower on average, or at least not higher, among affiliated index-linked 
funds (controlling for other factors) than among the other funds. Under the 
second, intermediate interpretation, we would expect to find that expense ratios 
are higher, on average among affiliated index-linked funds, but that management 
fees are about the same, on average. Finally, under the third, most pessimistic 
explanation, we would expect to see higher management fees. 
I begin with a univariate analysis, which includes a series of controls for 
fund style and year. These analyses are conceptually similar to estimating the 
difference in means between funds that use affiliated indices and those that do 




where yit is one of either expense ratio, management fee, or turnover ratio of fund 
i at time t, Affiliatei is an indicator variable equal to 1 if fund i tracks an affiliated 
index, and  is a vector of controls. For robustness, I run the analysis in a 
variety of possible ways. I use annual data on expense ratio, management fee, 
and turnover ratio for years 2015 through 2017.154 The results are presented in 
Table 7. Column (1) contains the results using style x year fixed effects, which 
is the most robust specification, as the control allows the relationship between 
style and the outcome variable to vary by year.155 Column (2) contains the results 
using style fixed effects and year fixed separately, and Column (3) contains the 
results using only style fixed effects. In all specifications, standard errors are 
clustered by fund, and standard errors are in parentheses. 
    The first thing to notice is that the results in all three panels are very stable, 
both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, across specifications. 
This suggests that the results are not being driven by the specific pattern of 
controls that I am using. The results in Panel A indicate that, on average, expense 
 
 153.   Id. at 25. 
 154.   I limit my window to the period from 2015 through 2017 because my affiliated 
index data are from the second half of 2017, using funds that existed at the end of 2016. Because the data 
must be hand-collected, collecting the data for multiple years was infeasible. 
 155.   For the purposes of the analysis in this Section, I rely on the style classification of 
each fund in the CRSP database and not on the style classifications of indices from Part I. Specifically, 
style is defined by the CRSP objective code of the ETF. This ensures that my results are based on standard 
style classification. 
1it i it ity Affiliatea b e= + ´ +Y +
itY
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ratios are higher among affiliated index-linked funds. At the same time, the 
results in Panels B and C indicate that, on average, the management fees and 
turnover ratios are indistinguishable between the two groups. 
 
Table 7: Univariate Relationship between Affiliated Index and Fund 
Characteristics  
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A – Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio 
 
Affiliated 0.0668** 0.0666** 0.0660**  
(3.15) (3.19) (3.17) 
Style Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Style x Year Fixed Effects YES NO NO 






N 1481 1481 1481 
    
Panel B – Dependent Variable: Management Fee 
 
Affiliated -1.06 -1.17 -1.21  
(-0.33) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
Style Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Style x Year Fixed Effects YES NO NO 






N 1481 1481 1481 
    
Panel C – Dependent Variable: Turnover Ratio 
 
Affiliated -4.95 -4.91 -4.83  
(-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.88) 
Style Fixed Effects NO YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Style x Year Fixed Effects YES NO NO 






N 1476 1476 1476 
 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of three different dependent variables: fund 
expense ratio (Panel A), fund management fee (Panel B), and fund turnover ratio (Panel C), 
on a dummy equal to one if the index being tracked by the ETF is an affiliated index, and 
zero otherwise. All dependent variables are multiplied by 100 (i.e., measured in percentage 
points) for ease of interpretation. All regressions contain controls for fund style, fund style 
and year, or style x year, as indicated. Standard errors are clustered by fund. 
 
The first result, that expense ratios are higher, is inconsistent with the first 
explanation, and the fact that management fees are not higher is in tension with 
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the third explanation. At the same time, the fact that the management fees are the 
same, statistically speaking, while the expense ratios are higher, is consistent 
with the second explanation. This explanation is bolstered by the fact that the 
turnover ratio is also statistically indistinguishable between the two groups. The 
reason for this is simple: in addition to management fees, trading costs add to the 
expenses associated with running a fund. The more a fund trades (i.e., the higher 
its turnover ratio), the more trading costs it incurs. The fact that turnover is not 
statistically higher at affiliated index-linked funds suggests that this is not what 
is going on. 
We can test this more directly by adding turnover ratio as a control in the 
original regression. Moreover, because management fees—at least to the extent 
that they are actually paid—are also included in the expense ratio, I also include 
that as a control variable. The results are presented in Table 8.156 
Table 8 confirms that both management fee and turnover ratio are 
positively associated with expense ratio. However, controlling for these factors, 
affiliated index-linked ETFs still have higher expense ratios. Specifically, 
Columns (1) and (2) show that, controlling for turnover ratio and management 
fees, respectively, affiliated index-linked ETFs have higher expense ratios than 
other ETFs. In Column (3), I control for both turnover ratio and management 
fees at the same time and find that affiliated index-linked ETFs still have higher 
expense ratios. Importantly, the coefficient on Affiliated hardly changes as we 
move from Column (1) to Column (3), despite the fact that the variables that are 
added are themselves statistically significant. These results show that even 
controlling for these two other factors, affiliated index-linked funds still have 
higher expense ratios. In fact, the coefficients on the Affiliated dummy in 
Columns (1) through (3) are actually larger, both in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance, than the ones in Panel A of Table 7.157 Next, because of 
the possibility that expense ratio and management fees might be differentially 
related to expense ratios for funds that use affiliated indices relative to those that 
don’t, in Column (4) I also include interaction terms of the form Turnover Ratio 
x Affiliated and Management Fee x Affiliated. As the results in Column (4) make 
clear, while these interaction terms are not statistically distinguishable, their 
inclusion substantially increases the point estimate of the coefficient on 
Affiliated. 
Management fees and turnover are not the only features of a fund that may 
be associated with expense ratios. Recognizing this, I introduce two additional 
 
 156.   In untabulated results, I run versions of the regressions presented in Table 8 using 
Management Fee as the dependent variable rather than Expense Ratio. In all specifications, the point 
estimate of the coefficient on Affiliated is negative, although it is generally statistically indistinguishable 
from zero. While not dispositive, these results also fail to provide evidence in favor of the third 
explanation. 
 157.   In untabulated results, I also vary the fixed effects. Specifically, as in Table 7, I 
use style fixed effects and style and year fixed effects. Because the effect of the coefficients of interest 
hardly changes, I omit these results for the sake of parsimony. 
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controls in Column (5). The first is a control for the fund’s age, measured as the 
natural logarithm of the number of years since the fund was first offered, which 
has been shown to be associated with expense ratios.158 The second is a control 
for the size of the fund, which has also been shown to be associated with expense 
ratios.159 
 
Table 8: Relationship between Affiliated Index and Expense Ratio  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable: Expense Ratio       
Affiliated 0.0726*** 0.0705*** 0.0750*** 0.132** 0.129**  
(3.72) (3.90) (4.38) (2.72) (2.87) 
Turnover Ratio 0.00121***  0.00102*** 0.00105*** 0.000791*** 
(3.74)  (3.66) (3.46) (3.59) 
Management 
Fee 
 0.00348** 0.00311** 0.00326** 0.00419*** 
 (3.10) (3.04) (2.75) (4.85) 
Turnover Ratio 
x Affiliated 
   -0.000536 -0.000442 
   (-1.12) (-1.07) 
Management 
Fee x Affiliated 
   -0.00118 -0.00193 
   (-0.77) (-1.48) 
ln(Age)     0.0294**  
    (3.04) 
ln(Size)     -0.0334*** 
     (-7.08) 
Style x Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 










N 1476 1481 1476 1476 1449 
R-squared 0.371 0.428 0.521 0.526 0.658 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.333 0.393 0.492 0.496 0.636 
 
t statistics in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
This table presents the results of regressing fund expense ratio on a dummy equal to one if the index 
being tracked by the ETF is an affiliated index, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) contain 
controls for the fund’s turnover ratio and management fee, respectively, and column (3) contains 
controls for both simultaneously. Column (4) adds interaction terms of the form Turnover Ratio x 
Affiliated and Management Fee x Affiliated. Column (5) adds a control for fund age, as measured 
by the natural logarithm of the number of years since the fund was first offered as well as a control 
for fund size, as measured by the natural logarithm of the total AUM of the fund. Expense ratio, 
management fee, and turnover ratio are multiplied by 100 (i.e., measured in percentage points) for 
ease of interpretation. All regressions contain controls for fund style x year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by fund. 
 
 
 158.   See generally Stephen P. Ferris & Don M. Chance, The Effect of 12b-1 Plans on 
Mutual Fund Expense Ratios: A Note, 42 J. FIN. 1077 (1987); D. K. Malhorta & Robert W. McLeod, An 
Empirical Analysis of Mutual Fund Expenses, 20 J. FIN. RES. 175 (1997). 
 159.   See generally Ferris & Chance, supra note 158; Malhorta & McLeod, supra note 
158. 
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While the coefficient on Affiliated falls slightly in column (5) relative to 
Column (4), it remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.160 
This indicates that the association between the use of affiliated indices is not 
subsumed by the inclusion of these additional controls. These results represent 
additional support in favor of the second explanation—that investors are 
attracted to ETFs and are sensitive to management fees, but that they do not 
necessarily notice the other costs that are associated with affiliated index-linked 
ETFs. That being said, it is important to note that there is no causal identification 
in this empirical design—the results simply indicate an association, not a causal 
link. As such, more work is needed to more completely understand the 
relationship between expenses—and ultimate performance—and the use of 
affiliated indices. 
IV. Implications 
Having established these empirical results, I now tie these results back to 
the discussion in Part I. I do so in three parts. First, I argue that the SEC’s current 
disclosure rules relating to indices are flawed (Section IV.A). Both in the context 
of benchmarking and index investing, the SEC’s current rules result in 
disclosures that provide the wrong information to investors. Building on this 
argument, I then address these two uses—index investing and benchmarking—
separately (Section IV.B). In the context of index investing, I provide a mixture 
of conceptual implications and concrete policy proposals aimed at better aligning 
the current regulatory regime with market realities. I then turn to the use of 
indices for benchmarking (Section IV.C). 
A. The SEC is Requiring Disclosure of the Wrong Information 
Put in the simplest possible terms, the central finding in the empirical 
portions of this Article is that we should be much more thoughtful about the use 
of indices. This is true both in the context of their use as benchmarks and in the 
context of index investing. For example, the degree of heterogeneity across 
indices, documented in Part II, makes it clear that indices are far from 
interchangeable. This is true even across indices that, based on their descriptions, 
are intended to capture the same or similar things. As we saw in some detail, two 
indices that purport to capture the same factor (such as, for example, “growth”) 
may do so in very different ways, and two large-cap indices may in fact contain 
firms of different sizes.161 As a consequence, in order to understand what the 
index is actually doing, one must, at a minimum, carefully examine the 
methodology underlying the index. Moreover, to the extent that the methodology 
 
 160.   For further robustness, I also estimate a version of the model in Column (5) that 
omits the interaction terms. The coefficient on Affiliated remains positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level, although the magnitude of the point estimate falls substantially. 
 161.   See discussion supra Section II.C.3. 
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is vague or opaque,162 even a careful examination my not be sufficient to fully 
understand how the index operates. 
Consider now the use of indices as benchmarks. The rationale for requiring 
mutual funds to present their performance relative to a benchmark is to help 
investors better evaluate the performance of the fund in question.163 What this 
means in practice, however, is that investors are presented with little more than 
the name of the benchmark index (or indices) and the performance of the fund 
relative to that index (or indices). It is easy to see why such a comparison is of, 
at best, limited value: it follows from simple logic that any comparison between 
two objects—for example, A and B—is as much about B as it is about A. More 
concretely, if the investor does not understand the operation of B (in this case, 
the benchmark), any comparison that she makes between A (in this case, the 
mutual fund in question) and B (the benchmark) will be problematic. 
Because of this, given the heterogeneity across indices that purport to 
capture the same or similar things, relying solely on the name of an index—
without having done extensive research into its construction—is at best 
meaningless (since such an investor cannot reasonably be expected to understand 
how the benchmark operates). At worst, to the extent that some investors’ 
perceptions of how the index is constructed differ from its true construction, such 
a comparison could result in confusion. Perversely, rather than helping investors 
make more informed decisions, requiring such comparisons actually has 
potential to be misleading.164 
Rather, for a benchmark index to be useful to investors (and potential 
investors), the investors need to be able to tell what that benchmark index is 
 
 162.   See discussion supra Section II.D. 
 163.   See discussion supra Section I.A.1. 
 164.   I note that under current rules, funds are permitted to compare themselves to 
multiple benchmarks. For the purposes of the analysis in Part II, I relied upon the primary prospectus 
benchmark, as reported by Morningstar Direct. It is, of course, possible that some of the funds in my 
sample reported their performance relative to other indices beyond the one listed as the primary prospectus 
benchmark. This fact may complicate the evaluation of the usefulness of these benchmarks, but it does 
not materially alter these conclusions. To the extent that investors are presented with multiple benchmarks, 
this may place additional strains on their cognitive capacity, as they must now investigate the construction 
and attributes of multiple indices rather than just one. One might counter that investors could choose to 
rely solely on one of the indices presented, selecting for example the most well-known index in the group, 
or one that they were already familiar with. While this might, in certain circumstances, mitigate the 
problem, it does not eliminate it, as the fact remains that the title alone is insufficient for making 
meaningful comparisons. Moreover, given the advances in behavioral finance demonstrating the extent to 
which phenomena such as anchoring and priming can affect individual decisionmaking, the possibility 
remains that investors may be particularly affected by the primary benchmark, even if they are presented 
with alternative benchmarks. For a discussion of anchoring, see Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A 
Survey of Behavioral Finance, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1066 (2003) 
(describing anchoring as a phenomenon where individuals often start with some initial value and then 
adjust away from that “anchor” and noting that this adjustment is often insufficient, leading to a final 
belief that is skewed toward the initial anchor). For a discussion of priming, see Paul Dolan, Antony 
Elliott, Robert Metcalfe & Ivo Vlaev, Influencing Financial Behavior: From Changing Minds to 
Changing Contexts, 13 J. BEHAV. FIN. 126, 131-32 (2013) (describing priming as the phenomenon where 
individuals’ subsequent behavior can be influenced by exposure to subtle stimuli, including visual 
stimuli). 
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actually doing. To the extent that the SEC is committed to maintaining its 
position that index comparisons are superior to comparisons to competitors (or 
peer funds),165 relying on the index name alone is insufficient. At a minimum, 
for such disclosures to be of any use to investors at all, they must include a 
description of how the benchmark index is constructed that is sufficiently 
detailed and sufficiently clear as to allow investors to make reasonably informed 
comparisons. Given the cognitive constraints that many retail investors face, it 
is not clear how plausible it is that one could craft such a description. I return to 
this issue in Section IV.C. 
The construction and management of the underlying index is even more 
important in the context of index investing, since the index is effectively making 
portfolio allocation decisions on behalf of the mutual fund or funds that track it. 
Here again, to the extent that investors are receiving information about the 
indices in question, they are receiving it about the wrong things. 
Yet again, for all the reasons discussed in the last few paragraphs, telling 
investors the name of the index that an index fund is tracking does not give 
investors enough information to meaningfully understand how the fund will 
operate.166 And while most mutual fund offering documents provide some 
additional information about the underlying index—which is certainly better 
than what investors receive in the benchmark context—that information remains 
insufficient. Once we recognize that index investing is simply a form of 
delegated management, it becomes clear that the disclosure regarding these 
indices should reflect this underlying reality. I discuss this further in Section 
IV.B. 
B. Recognize that Index Investing is Delegated Management 
One clear implication of the analysis in Parts II and III has to do with 
“index” investing. Every one of the over 600 indices in my comprehensive 
sample—and the over 550 in my index fund subsample—gave the index provider 
at least some amount of discretion. Even the most mechanical indices—those that 
follow strict quantitative rules—allow for some discretion on the part of the 
index committee. In the context of a fund that tracks the index, this discretion 
implies that the index provider’s decisions will have a flow-through effect on the 
investor’s portfolio. This in turn implies that, far from being passive, index 
investing is properly understood as a form of delegated management. 
To be sure, the amount this delegation varies significantly across indices. 
While some relied largely on quantitative rules, others gave substantial amounts 
of discretion to certain individuals, which is hard for a third party to anticipate, 
particularly when the identities of the individuals in question are not clearly 
 
 165.   See supra text accompanying note 24. 
 166.   See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text. 
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disclosed.167 Moreover, many indices rely on information that third parties, such 
as investor and prospective investors, cannot readily obtain,168 making it difficult 
to argue that the investor knows precisely what the index will do in the future. 
Others still have features that are deliberately opaque and which make it 
impossible for a third party—including an investor or potential investor—to 
determine how exactly it is constructed. For example, billions of dollars are 
indexed to indices that are explicitly relying on proprietary features,169 
something that can only be referred to as delegated management. Hundreds of 
billions more are indexed to indices that are, for practical purposes, executing 
strategies similar to what one would expect to find in an “actively” managed 
fund.170 
Even if the rules are fairly precise and allow for relatively little discretion, 
indices need to allow room for the rules to change, or to resolve circumstances 
as they arise. In theory, this need not imply delegated management. For example, 
the way the index is going to deal with these could be announced well in advance 
and communicated to all investors who own shares in such funds, giving the 
investor the opportunity to remove her funds if she is unhappy with the decision. 
In practice, however, this is highly implausible. For this to work, the investor 
would have to keep a close watch on her portfolio and, more importantly, on 
what the index manager is doing. Because these changes happen rather 
frequently,171 this would imply that the investor is spending substantial amounts 
of time investigating the implications of these changes on a regular basis. While 
this might be possible in theory, doing so runs counter to the very concept of 
“passive” investing. The whole point of “passive” investing is that the investor 
doesn’t have to pay attention to her portfolio. If an investor is constantly 
monitoring the underlying index, she may not necessarily be delegating the 
management of her portfolio, but she is also not meaningfully engaged in what 
would conventionally be called passive investing. 
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with delegated management. 
While scholars have expressed concerns about the corporate governance 
implications of institutional investors,172 for many investors, being able to 
delegate management of their portfolio to a third party is a boon. A well-
diversified portfolio—something that many portfolio managers offer—generally 
has far less risk than the type of concentrated portfolio that many individual 
 
 167.   Some examples of the former include the CRSP family of indices, see supra note 
130 and accompanying text, and the Russell indices, see supra note 135 and accompanying text. Some 
examples of the latter include the Dow Jones Industrial Average, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying 
text; supra note 131 and accompanying text, and the Morningstar Wide Moat index, see supra notes 134-
135 and accompanying text. 
 168.   See, e.g., supra Section II.D.2. 
 169.   See supra Section II.C.4. 
 170.   See supra Section II.C.4. 
 171.   See supra Section II.D.3. 
 172.   See Bebchuk et al., supra note 29. 
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investors, if left to their own devices, tend to hold.173 Moreover, individual 
investors tend to exhibit trading patterns and other behaviors that systematically 
reduce the returns on their investments,174 something that they may be able to 
avoid by engaging in delegated management. 
Moreover, the form of delegated management implied by investing in an 
“index fund” may also be better—from the perspective of the investor—than 
other forms of delegated management, such as that of an actively managed 
mutual fund. Index funds tend to have far lower management fees,175 and thus 
tend to offer superior returns to investors. My point is not that there is anything 
wrong with the delegated management implied by an index fund, only that it is 
still delegated management and should be recognized as such. 
1. Proposal: Recognize that the Underlying Index Represents a 
Fundamental Attribute of an Index Fund 
Nevertheless, this delegation may have other consequences, particularly as 
it relates to investor protection.176 While a mutual fund cannot deviate from its 
fundamental policies, as stated in its registration statement, without a shareholder 
vote,177 there is no restriction on an index’s ability to change its methodology. 
This asymmetry leaves investors in “index” funds with fewer protections, and 
potentially facing higher risks, than investors in actively managed mutual funds. 
This risk is particular acute in the context of index funds that track a 
specialized index, which is not being used by any other entities. Whereas an 
index that is being used by many market participants may have an incentive to 
maintain the integrity of the index, this incentive is dulled when the index has 
only one user. This may be even more extreme in the case of ETFs that follow 
affiliated indices, where the same entity (or an affiliate thereof) is managing both 
the index and the fund. As a result, the protections afforded to investors by the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 in the context of delegation to managers do 
not exist in the context of delegation to an index provider. 
 
 173.   Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Behavior of Individual Investors, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1533, 1560-1563 (2013) (surveying evidence that 
individuals fail to optimally diversify their portfolios). 
 174.   See generally id. 
 175.   See Trends in the Expenses and Fees of Funds, 2017, INV. COMPANY INST. RES. 
PERSP. 1 (Apr. 2018), https://www.ici.org/pdf/per24-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYD2-RLJU] (noting that 
in 2017, the average expense ratio was 0.78% for actively managed equity mutual funds, compared to 
0.09% for index equity mutual funds). 
 176.   This delegated management may also have corporate governance implications. 
This is likely to be most relevant in the context of delegation to very large indices like the S&P 500. I 
discuss this implication in a related paper. See generally Robertson, supra note 7. 
 177.   15 U.S.C. § 80a-13(a)(3) (2018) (prohibiting investment companies from 
deviating from certain investment policies, as well as “any policy recited in its registration statement 
pursuant to section 80a–8(b)(3) of this title,” unless authorized to do so by the vote of a majority of its 
outstanding voting securities); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(b)(3) (2018) (consisting of “all policies of the 
registrant, not enumerated in paragraphs (1) and (2), in respect of matters which the registrant deems 
matters of fundamental policy”). 
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Fortunately, there is a simple solution to this problem. Once we recognize 
that delegating to an index is no different than delegating to a fund manager, we 
can craft a solution based on the existing rules. Any time the underlying index 
makes a change that, if made by the fund manager in a comparable actively 
managed fund, would trigger a vote, the fund manager is required to hold a vote 
on retaining the index. This simple change would harmonize the protections 
offered to investors in the two types of funds. 
An additional benefit of this proposal is that it does not rely on the creation 
of an entirely new regulatory apparatus for indices. Instead, it simply relies on 
the existing regulatory regime for mutual funds, making it simple to implement. 
Specifically, the proposal would not place any direct obligations on the 
underlying indices. Instead, the obligation would be on any fund that chose to 
track an index. This obligation would then flow through to the index provider 
through market forces: index providers generate revenue by licensing the use of 
their indices to market participants, including index funds. Because any index 
that refused to cooperate with fund managers would be opening the fund up to 
potential liability, fund managers would simply require that the index provider 
provide the necessary information. This would include information sufficient to 
determine whether or not a shareholder vote is required, and if it is, sufficient 
disclosure for the vote to proceed. While indices would be free to decline to 
provide this information, doing so would almost certainly imply a loss of 
licensing fees, since fund managers are unlikely to stick with an index that 
refuses to allow them to meet their obligations. 
Structuring the obligation in this way would have three major benefits. 
First, by implicating only those indices that are tracked by index funds, the rule 
avoids the risk of being over inclusive. As discussed above, there are tens of 
thousands of different financial market indices.178 A rule that applied to all 
indices would be like using a sledgehammer to crack a walnut. In contrast, this 
approach is narrowly tailored to fill a specific regulatory gap and solve the 
problem at hand. Second, such a rule would implicitly shift the obligation to 
monitor the underlying indices from individual fund investors to the fund’s 
managers. Because these individuals are vastly better suited for this role, the shift 
is likely to be efficiency enhancing and therefore increase total wellbeing. 
Finally, by virtue of this shift in monitoring obligations, fund managers are likely 
to demand more and better disclosures from index providers. Even if these 
disclosures never become available to the broader market, the existence of the 
scrutiny alone is likely to have a disciplining function on index providers. 
Of course, the shareholder voting mechanism required by the Investment 
Company Act is not without its critics. For example, John Morley and Quinn 
Curtis have argued persuasively that shareholder voting is fraught with problems 
in the mutual fund context and that a far better approach to mutual fund 
 
 178.   See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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governance is to take exit rights seriously.179 This proposal is not intended to 
take issue with their argument. Rather, it should be interpreted as a call to 
recognize the importance of the underlying index to an index fund and to 
harmonize the regulatory treatment of index funds with those of actively 
managed funds. To the extent that the SEC wants to preserve the shareholder 
voting mechanism for fundamental policies, it should recognize that, in the 
context of index funds, what it should look to is the underlying index. If instead 
the SEC wishes to move away from this and toward another mechanism—such 
as, for example, a meaningful disclosure mechanism—this proposal should not 
be viewed as an argument against such a change. Rather, the point is that any 
such regulatory change should recognize the unique importance of the 
underlying index to an index fund and should proceed accordingly. 
2. Proposal: Increase Index Fund Disclosures Around the Underlying 
Index 
The results in Part III raise additional consumer protection concerns. 
Specifically, the results support the idea that funds may be taking advantage of 
the popularity of ETFs—and the idea that they have low management fees—
while passing costs along to investors in other ways. One potential avenue for 
this is licensing fees. For example, rather than paying licensing fees to a third 
party, a fund that tracks an affiliated index may essentially be paying a licensing 
fee to itself. In both cases, this licensing fee would count as an expense of the 
fund and would show up in the fund’s expense ratio. However, while in the 
former case the fee represents an arm’s-length transaction, the latter is, at best, a 
transfer among affiliates, raising the possibility that the prices may be set 
strategically. To the extent that investors are more sensitive to a fund’s 
management fees than they are to its expense ratio, it might not be surprising for 
funds to take advantage of this by charging themselves higher licensing fees than 
they would be prepared to pay to a third-party index provider. 
I emphasize that while this story about licensing fees is consistent the with 
the results in Part III, I have no specific evidence of such behavior. All the same, 
the potential for such behavior is problematic. One possible solution to this 
problem is to simply ban the use of affiliated indices by index funds, forcing 
them to instead use third party indices. While this might take care of the problem, 
prohibition is a blunt instrument, and it is not an ideal solution. As with anything 
else in financial markets, doing so runs the risk of both stifling innovation and 
generating unintended consequences. 
 
 179.   See generally John D. Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why 
Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010). While many of 
Morley and Curtis’s policy proposals involve directly regulating features that are viewed as problematic, 
central to their argument is the fact that exit plays a uniquely important role in the mutual fund context. 
The discussion in this Section picks up on this latter aspect of their analysis. 
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Instead, the consumer protection concerns can be addressed through more 
and better disclosure. At present, such disclosures are not specifically required. 
As I found upon reading the prospectus documents, these disclosures, if they 
exist at all, are often incomplete, hard to locate, and difficult to interpret. And 
yet the information about the underlying index is of crucial importance to 
investors in index funds in a way that it is not for investors in active funds. The 
required disclosures should reflect this. 
Specifically, any fund that has, as its objective, to track a particular 
underlying index should be required to provide clear, consistent, and prominent 
disclosures about that index. These disclosures should include (1) the identity of 
the index provider and (2) whether any person or entity affiliated with the fund 
in any way (i) is affiliated with the index provider, (ii) was involved in designing 
the index, (iii) has any ongoing ability to influence the index, or (iv) has been 
involved in any changes to the index, and if so, what those changes were. The 
disclosures should then go on to include the compensation of the individuals 
involved in the creation and management of the index, as well as any conflicts 
of interest they may face.180 
In addition, the section should also include a simple disclosure of the 
licensing fees paid by the fund to the index provider. The reason for this is 
simple: just as actively managed mutual funds must disclose their management 
fees, index funds should disclose the fee that they are paying to the entity that is 
responsible for selecting investments—the index provider. This amount should 
be expressed both in terms of the contribution of these fees to the fund’s expense 
ratio and as a percentage of the fund’s assets under management. These index 
disclosures should be placed in their own section immediately following the 
“Principal Investment Strategy” section. 
These disclosures would help to clarify the relationships between indices 
and funds and would be particularly useful in contexts where the fund has a close 
relationship with the underlying index. Of course, an understanding of how the 
index operates is important even in the context of indices that are truly at arm’s 
length from the fund. For example, at present, mutual fund investors are entitled 
to detailed disclosures about the identity and compensation of fund managers.181 
In contrast, investors are generally provided with virtually no information about 
the identity of compensation structure of the individuals responsible for 
managing the index that the fund tracks. If we recognize that in the context of 
index investing, the ultimate delegee is the index creator, it is hard to find a 
justification for this differential treatment. 
 
 180.   Given the complexities of this market, the precise details of what these disclosures 
should look like requires further empirical and theoretical study. 
 181.   See, e.g., SEC, FORM N-1A, supra note 20, Item 5(b) (requiring disclosure of the 
names and other information associated with the fund’s portfolio managers—i.e., the individuals primarily 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the fund’s portfolio); Item 20(b) (requiring disclosure of 
the structure of each portfolio manager’s compensation, as well as the method used to determine such 
compensation). 
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Fortunately, here again there is a simple solution. In addition to the above 
discussed disclosures about the index, index funds should also be required to 
provide disclosures about the individuals responsible for the management of the 
index that are analogous to the disclosures that are currently required about the 
individuals responsible for managing the fund. 
This solution would help to limit the risk to investors without stifling 
financial market innovation. Funds would be free to create their own indices and 
to charge whatever licensing fees they wished. Moreover, indices would be free 
to operate in any way that they wished. An index that, for whatever reason, did 
not want to allow public disclosures related to its managers would be free to 
decline to do so. Of course, the cost of doing so would be that mutual funds 
would no longer be able to track these indices, thereby depriving the index 
creator of potentially lucrative licensing fees. Index creators would be free to 
make their own business decisions about which of these options to choose. 
Similarly, this solution would place no restrictions on investor choice as it relates 
to index funds. Instead, it would simply ensure that they are fully informed about 
one of the most important features of such funds. 
C. Rethink the Use of Indices as Benchmarks 
A second set of implications of the analysis in Part II has to do with the use 
of indices as performance benchmarks. As discussed in Section I.C, any 
comparison of a portfolio against a benchmark is as much about the benchmark 
itself as it is about the portfolio. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong 
with this—it is just a fundamental feature of the way comparisons work and is 
true for any benchmark, not just in financial markets.182 As long as one has a 
clear understanding of the material features of the benchmark index, such 
comparisons can be quite useful. 
Problems arise, however, when one does not have a clear understanding of 
the underlying benchmark. At best, such a comparison would be useless, in that 
it would provide no useful insights into how to interpret the performance of the 
portfolio of interest. This could be the case if the investor was aware of the fact 
that she does not understand the benchmark. In that case, a rational investor 
would realize that the index provides her with no useful information. Because 
she is always free to disregard information that she does not believe is useful, the 
investor could simply ignore the benchmark. As a result, while reporting the 
returns on the benchmark does not help the investor, at least she is not harmed 
by it. 
Of course, this assumed that the investor was fully rational and knew that 
she did not understand the benchmark well enough for it to be useful. If this is 
 
 182.   For example, consider a literal benchmark: a marking on a tool bench. Such a 
marking can be useful in measuring the length of another other object—for example, a piece of wood—
only to the extent that one has a clear idea of the length of the benchmark itself. 
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not the case, providing the benchmark could actually be misleading, leading an 
investor (or potential investor) to an erroneous conclusion. Unfortunately, the 
more the investor (or potential investor) believes the benchmark to be relevant, 
the more likely she is to find herself in the latter case. 
The analysis in Part II suggests that, simply by the sheer number of different 
indices being used as benchmarks and the sheer amount of diversity across these 
indices, at least some investors are likely to find themselves in the latter position. 
While it may be plausible for an investor to have a reasonable understanding of 
the working of a small number of indices,183 the idea that she would have a solid 
understanding of a large number of them is implausible. Even assuming that she 
could access the required information, since the vast majority—nearly eighty 
percent—of indices in my full sample are being used by only a single fund, it is 
unlikely that she would find it worthwhile to invest the time required to 
understand it. Even among the non-index fund subsample—the mutual funds that 
are not index funds—the median index is being used by only two funds, 
demonstrating that this is not a concern that is unique to index funds. Moreover, 
because of the diversity across indices, she cannot simply transfer her knowledge 
about one index to another, as doing so is as likely to result in error as it is to be 
helpful. Finally, for the same reasons that index investing should be understood 
as delegated management, the assumption that the investor would be able to 
access the required information is unlikely to hold. 
1. Proposal: Reconsider the Benchmarking Requirement 
One potential solution to this problem is to reconsider the benchmarking 
requirement. It is quite possible that the requirement made good sense in 1993 
when it was first adopted: my analysis is based on data from 2017 and later, and 
it is entirely possible that the landscape of securities indices has changed 
dramatically in the intervening decades. However, given the features of the 
market today, it may be time for the SEC to reconsider its conclusion that 
benchmarks provide a better comparator than other investment opportunities, 
such as competitor funds.184 
Naturally, the use of competitors is not a silver bullet, and this should not 
be taken as a full-throated argument for the wholesale rejection of benchmarking. 
Rather, my argument is more modest: in light of this evidence about the current 




 183.   I use the term “may” with caution. In fact, even the S&P 500, which is arguably 
the most prominent index of the U.S. stock market and which is the most popular index in my sample by 
a significant margin, is poorly understood. See Robertson, supra note 7. 
 184.   See supra text accompanying note 24. 
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2. Proposal: If the Benchmark Requirement is Retained, Require 
Sufficient Disclosure to Allow for Meaningful Comparisons 
Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, a colorable case can be made 
that, in the absence of a clearly implementable and demonstrably superior 
alternative, mutual funds should continue to provide performance information 
relative to a benchmark. While one could reasonably believe that benchmarks 
are, at present, the most practicable option, it does not follow that the status quo 
should be maintained. Rather, to the extent that the SEC chooses to retain its 
benchmarking requirements, these requirements should be modified so as to 
provide enough information for investors to meaningfully use them. 
This may be more easily said than done. As discussed previously, for a 
benchmark to provide any useful information to an investor, that investor must 
be able to determine how the benchmark index is constructed.185 Moreover, it 
must do so in a way that is both short enough that investors will actually read it 
and simple enough for the average retail investor to understand it. These 
requirements are not at all trivial, and determining the best way of achieving this 
would require further study. 
Conclusion 
In this Article, I provide new insights on the landscape of U.S. stock market 
indices. I document substantial heterogeneity across the universe of indices used 
as benchmarks for U.S. mutual funds and as the index underlying index funds. I 
then show that a substantial proportion of ETFs track indices of their—or their 
affiliates’—own making. My findings shed light on a previously understudied 
corner of the financial markets and have substantial implications for investor 
protection. 
 
 185.   See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
